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1 Introduction
The topic of this doctoral thesis is to analyze the effect of civic capital on contractual relationships between
economic agents, both within and between firms. All three chapters are empirical studies, conducted in the
context of Italy. The concept of civic capital is a relatively new research area in the realm of economics.
Although Noble Prize winner Kenneth Arrow stated as early as 1972 that “Virtually every commercial
transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of
time”, it is only since the mid 1990s that economics systematically investigate the role of trust in economic
interactions.1
1.1 Chapter 1
The first chapter of this thesis analyses the role of civic capital in intra firm relationship. The cooperation
enhancing effect of civic capital is especially important in this context as relationships within firms take place
in situations in which other mechanism that induce cooperative outcomes are ineffective: First, measurement
problems of performance and unobservability of actions render third-party contract enforcement unfeasible.
Second, interactions do not take place frequently so there is no space for interpersonal trust to evolve. Third,
agents typically are not related to their partners by personal bonds. Using Italian census data, the analysis
reveals that civic capital increases the size and the dispersion of establishments. Civic capital turns out to
have a positive effect on both the average and the standard deviation of the plant size distribution. This
effect is stronger in labor-intensive industries. The potential endogeneity of current civic capital is addressed
by instrumenting it with historical variables. Moreover, we explicitly address the problem of measurement
error of civic capital by extracting the first principal component of three proxies, namely electoral turnout
in referenda, blood donation and volunteering. Our interpretation for these results is that civic capital is
associated with reduced opportunistic behavior, which improves intra-firm cooperation and hampers the
incidence of principal-agent problems, thus allowing plants to operate on a larger scale.
1.2 Chapter 2
The second chapter analysis the effect of civic capital in contractual relationships between firms. the influ-
ential transaction costs literature (Williamson, 1979, 1985) stresses that, when faced with the make-or-buy
decision, firms choose the form of exchange that minimizes transaction costs. If civic capital decreases
opportunistic behavior, contract incompleteness should decrease as well. Therefore, we expect more trans-
action on the market where civic capital is high. We test this prediction by analyzing the pattern of service
outsourcing. The results show that firms tend to outsource more services to external suppliers where civic
capital is higher. We estimate that a one standard deviation increase in social capital, according to the
measure employed, brings an increase in the share of purchased services over sales between 4% and 6%.
The firms that are more heavily influenced are the smaller ones. Again, potential sources of endogeneity are
addressed by instrumenting civic capital by historical values and by extracting the first principal component.
1See Arrow (1972).
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1.3 Chapter 3
The last chapter instead investigates the effect of civic capital for foreign affiliates. While a huge literature
has tackled the question of whether foreign affiliates outperform their domestic counterparts, these studies
do not reach a consensus on this issue. We complement this literature by arguing that civic capital has
a differential impact on firm performance according to whether a firm is domestically or foreign owned.
Specifically, we expect that the performance of foreign affiliates hinges on a larger extend on civic capital
than purely domestic firms. The reason is that agency problems are exacerbated when a firm operates
in different countries. Not only does the production process require an efficient organization, but spatial
separation makes monitoring difficult and increases the scope of asymmetric information and the related
contractual problems. This question is analyzed in the last chapter by employing a panel dataset of Italian
manufacturing firms. Specifically, we first estimate total factor productivity which is then regressed on our
variables of interest, namely the stock of civic capital in the province where the firm is located interacted
with a dummy identifying a foreign affiliate.
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2 Chapter 1: Explaining the Size Distribution of Plants: An Ap-
proach Based on Civic Capital
2.1 Introduction
What determines the size distribution of economic organizations in different industries? Oligopoly theory
stresses the role of market size: in large markets, competitive pressures are intense and reduce the mark-
up of firms. In order to recover the fixed costs of production, each firm has to operate on a larger scale,
which increases average size. Similarly, models of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms such
as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) predict that market size increases both average size and the standard
deviation of size. Empirical evidence has confirmed these theoretical predictions. Employing data on 13
retail industries in the US, Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) show that market size has a magnifying effect
on average establishment size. Moreover, they find that the dispersion in plant size is positively related to
the size of the local market in some retail industries, but not in all of them. Similarly, Syverson (2004)
shows that, for the concrete industry in the US, market size increases plant size.
In this paper, we empirically identify another fundamental determinant of the size distribution of estab-
lishments: the stock of local civic capital.2 Employing Italian 2001 Census data, we show that civic capital
allows economic organizations to operate on a larger scale, leading to higher average plant size. Moreover,
our results document an increase in the dispersion of establishment size. We motivate these findings by an
important property of civic capital in that it serves as a check against opportunistic behavior and hence in-
creases the likelihood of cooperative outcomes in collective endeavors. Therefore, civic capital plays a crucial
role in intra-firm relationships, where a smooth flow of information is required for decision making, where
CEOs have to efficiently coordinate a wide variety of tasks, where decisions have to be communicated in a
transparent way, and diverging individual interests need to be bridged for the sake of the firm as a whole. In
short, the internal efficiency of organizations depends crucially on the extent to which individuals cooperate.
In principle, there exist several mechanisms which sustain cooperation, such as relational contracts, external
enforcement, or kinship bonds. However, interactions within firms often take place in contexts where (i)
external enforcement is hampered by unobservability of actions or problems of performance measurement,
(ii) interactions are not repeated frequently, and (iii) agents are not related to their partner by personal
bonds. In those situations cooperation among individuals hinges crucially on civic capital and its associated
high level of trust. In addition, the importance of civic capital in sustaining cooperation depends on the
size of the organization in that the scope for opportunistic defection increases with the number of workers.
Standard models of moral hazard predict that the probability of shirking increases with team size (Holm-
strom, 1982), as each member gets a lower share of output. Moreover, relational contracting is less feasible
because interactions between any two members of an organization become less frequent.
Our choice of focusing on Italian data bears several important advantages. First, the variation in the
endowment of civic capital across Italy has received ample interest in social sciences (Banfield, 1958; Putnam,
1993; Guiso et al., 2004, 2008a). This allows us to circumvent the contentious measurement issue, as we
2Although conceptually closely related, we avoid using the loaded term of social capital. See section 2.2 for a definition of
civic capital and its relationship with trust.
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can fall back on a range of well-established proxies which are available at a geographically disaggregated
level. Specifically, we build on Guiso et al. (2004) and measure civic capital by the number of blood
donations and electoral turnout in referenda.3 The extent to which individuals engage in volunteering in
non-profit organizations completes the set of measures. Second, working on Italy allows us to use data from
the 8th Census on Industry and Services (2001) which provides detailed information on the 4.4 millions
plants operating in Italy. Hence, our analysis does not suffer from sample selection issues, provided that we
are working with the universe of Italian establishments. Third, by focusing on one country, other factors
typically affecting plant size like government subsidies, employment regulation or tax regimes are held
constant.
In order to claim a causal impact of civic capital on economic outcomes, it is crucial to overcome several
potential sources of endogeneity. The first problem concerns measurement error. None of our three proxies
accurately reflects the true stock of civic capital. In order to minimize measurement error and the resulting
attenuation bias, we extract the first principle component of the three variables of civic capital.
The second problem is the issue of reversed causality. According to the modernization theory, economic
development has a direct impact on the formation of cultural and social values, thereby determining the
level of civic capital (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). Similarly, trust in others is likely to be triggered by trust
in political and legal institutions (Rothstein, 2000). Accordingly, efficient law enforcement both produces
high levels of civic capital and favors economic activity, resulting in large plants. Similarly to Buonanno
et al. (2009) and de Blasio and Nuzzo (2010), we use historical data to overcome the problem of reversed
causality and omitted variables. In particular, we use information on civic capital at the middle of the 19th
and beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, relying on Putnam (1993) and Guiso et al. (2008a), a second
set of instruments is based on the number of free-city states in the territory of a province during the Middle
Age.
Several controls ensure that our results are not driven by confounding factors. To separate civic capital
from confounding unobservables related to socio-economic development, we exploit only its variation at
the provincial level within the 20 Italian regions, by including a dummy for each region. In addition, we
interpret our data set as a panel, where observations pertaining to a given industry are collected repeatedly
over different provinces. Industry-specific heterogeneity is accordingly removed by four-digit Nace industry
fixed effects. Moreover, based on Input-Output Use tables, we construct a proxy for local final demand.
The quality of contract enforcement, human capital, financial development, urbanization rates in 1861, and
GDP, all defined at the province level, complete the set of controls.
Results reveal that the variation of civic capital has a magnifying impact on both the mean and the
dispersion of the plant size distribution. Consistently with this, we find that the number of large plants is
higher in high-civic capital areas. We attribute this increase to the fact that civic capital is associated with
a reduction in opportunistic behavior of agents in the local area, which in turn leads to more cooperation in
intra-firm relationships, and hampers the incidence of principal-agent problems. We discuss at length these
mechanisms below. Empirically, the effect of civic capital is heterogeneous across different industries: we
find that the impact is stronger in industries where the capital-labor ratio is low. Concerning the economic
magnitude of our results, the model predicts that the difference in the endowment of civic capital between
3Other studies which use these measures include Buonanno et al. (2009), and de Blasio and Nuzzo (2010).
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the provinces of Naples (low civic capital) and Milan (high civic capital) is associated with a difference in
the average size of plants of 25%.
The positive relationship between civic capital and the size of organizations is a priori not straightforward,
though. In principle, there are at least two mechanisms why civic capital could actually be associated with
a decrease in average plant size. On the one hand, the influential transaction costs literature (Williamson,
1979, 1985) stresses that, when faced with the make-or-buy decision, firms choose the form of exchange
that minimizes transaction costs. If civic capital decreases opportunistic behavior, contract incompleteness
should decrease as well. Consequently, market transactions become more attractive relative to in-house
production, and so some activities are outsourced to external suppliers and the average size of plants could
decrease.4 On the other hand, civic capital is positively related to entrepreneurship. Tabellini (2010) shows
that the prevailing cultural traits in Southern Italy are such that they discourage individual initiative and
effort, which is supposed to hinder the foundation of new firms.5 Accordingly, de Blasio and Nuzzo (2010)
and Percoco (2011) show that in the Italian context civic capital increases entrepreneurship, which could
then decrease the average size of plants, provided that newly established firms are smaller.
All in all, the Census data we employ unambiguously reveal that the overall effect of civic capital on
the average size of organizations is positive, despite the fact that the mechanisms just mentioned point to
a possibile negative effect. This is one contribution of our paper.
Another contribution is that we identify a novel determinant that affects the size distribution of plants,
beside local market size. Moreover, while papers like Syverson (2004) and Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005)
limit their analysis to a narrow set of industries, our study establishes a regularity which holds for the whole
spectrum of economic activity.
Next, whereas the literature on the determinants of firm size has stressed the role of formal institutions
such as the quality of contract enforcement or the protection of property rights (Kumar et al., 1999; Laeven
and Woodruff, 2007; Lu and Tao, 2009), our analysis implies that informal institutions matter directly in
this respect.
Finally, the idea that informal institutions such as trust are important for the functioning of large
organizations has been formulated by Fukuyama (1995). However, he does not corroborate his claim with
some strong empirical evidence. La Porta et al. (1997) provide a cross-country analysis of the relative
importance of large organizations and the level of trust. They analyze the sales of the top twenty largest
firms relative to national GDP. Differently from them, our analysis focuses on the absolute size of the
universe of plants in Italy. Bloom et al. (2009) are closer to our approach, since they show, in a cross-
country analysis, that the average of firm size for manufacturing as a whole, measured at the regional level
in terms of NUTS 2 spatial units, is larger in regions where trust is higher. Our paper substantially improves
their analysis in terms of precision in at least two ways. First, we are able to assess how the size distribution
within each single 4-digit Nace industry in the Italian Census changes according to the variation in the level
of trust. Second, we do it at a very detailed spatial scale (provinces, which correspond to NUTS 3 spatial
4In a related study (Bu¨rker and Minerva, 2010) we show that civic capital favors outsourcing of business services. Specifically,
relative to overall sales, firms acquire more services on the market in areas where civic capital is high.
5Similarly, in his illustrative study on social and economic life in a small village in Southern Italy, Banfield (1958) has
observed a mentality of the local population characterized by resignation and helplessness.
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units).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we provide a definition of civic capital and
outline how it relates to opportunistic behavior and trust. In section 2.5, we present the data and describe
the construction of the variables. Section 2.9 presents the baseline OLS analysis. Sections 2.13 and 2.16
provide robustness analysis and two-stages least square results, respectively. Finally, section 2.19 concludes.
2.2 Conceptual framework
2.3 The concept of civic capital
Guiso et al. (2010) define civic capital as “those persistent and shared beliefs and values that help a
group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities”.6 Two immediate and
interrelated predictions of civic capital can be derived from this definition. First, civic capital is associated
with a reduction in opportunism. This is an immediate implication from the definition, as free-riding in
collective endeavors is a genuine form of opportunistic behavior. Second, areas with more civic capital
are expected to have higher levels of trust. The literature has stressed that the decision to trust another
group or person depends on both the belief in the trustworthiness of others and on individual preferences
(Fehr, 2009; Sapienza et al., 2007). Opportunistic behavior, defined as “self-interest seeking which guile”
includes “calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse” (Williamson, 1985,
p. 47). It is therefore reasonable to assume that in an area in which opportunistic behavior is widespread,
individuals form adverse beliefs about the trustworthiness of others, resulting in a distrusting environment.
Similarly, to the extent that civic capital is associated with widespread pro-social preferences, this should
also lead to high trust (Fehr, 2009). Given the interrelatedness between civic capital and trust, in what
follows we will use the two terms interchangeably.7
2.4 Civic capital, trust and the size of organizations
The reasoning above suggests that civic capital improves overall organizational efficiency of firms by facil-
itating cooperation and reducing the scope of agency problems and dilemmas of collective actions, which
are centered around opportunism. Arrow (1968) has made this point plainly clear by stating that “one
of the characteristics of a successful economic system is that the relations of trust and confidence between
6This deviation from strict self-interest can be explained by pro-social attitudes such as altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002),
inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), preferences for reciprocal fairness (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) or more generally
by strongly internalized values which constitute a moral obligation not to defect (Portes, 1998). An alternative mechanism
stresses the social component of civic capital. Specifically, individuals cooperate in order not to be socially ostracized by their
fellows (Portes, 1998).
7It is important to stress that in the agency literature trust is usually modelled as an endogenous outcome of firm strategies.
The enhancement of trust can be obtained through motivational schemes (Casadesus-Masanell, 2004) or by facilitating social
interactions outside the workplace during sport activities, holidays, etc. (Spagnolo, 1999). We abstain from all these aspects
and consider trust as exogenously determined by civic capital. Empirical evidence corroborates the validity of this assumption.
Employing data on a large Italian bank, Ichino and Maggi (2000) demonstrate that individual background is a chief determinant
of cooperative behavior at the workplace. Along these lines, we assume that intra-plant cooperation is exclusively determined
by the stock of civic capital in the province where the plant is located, as embodied by the workers.
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principal and agent are sufficiently strong so that the agent will not cheat even though it may be ‘rational
economic behavior’ to do so”.8
In this section we outline three specific mechanisms of how civic capital improves cooperation in intra-
firm relationships such that it increases establishment size. However, our analysis does not allow to make a
qualitative assessment of their relative importance. Rather, the aim is to show that our empirical findings are
well-grounded in the predictions of some theoretical models. First, we look at the decision of the principal
to delegate decision rights to the agent. Next, we consider team production, while the third mechanism by
which civic capital impacts on plant size relies on the fact that, as organizations get larger, cooperation in
one-shot transactions becomes increasingly more important.
2.4.1 Trust and the delegation of authority
The first mechanism of how civic capital translates into larger establishment size works through the delega-
tion of decision authority by CEOs to subordinate managers. In theoretical models of allocation of decision
rights, trust makes the objective functions of the principal and the agent more similar. The rationale behind
is that a reduction in opportunistic behavior implies that the agent is less likely to take actions which merely
serve his private goals rather than the benefit of the organization as a whole. In Aghion and Tirole (1997)
these congruence effects increase the agent’s willingness to pay for authority relative to the principal which
leads to more delegation. Alternatively, in Dessein (2002), higher similarity in objective functions reduces
the incurred loss of control by the principal and improves communication. Under standard assumptions on
the uncertainty of the environment, the decrease in the loss of control outweighs the communication effect
which leads to more delegation. Delegation of tasks and decision rights, in turn, is crucial for the growth of
the size of plants. Penrose (1959) stressed that CEOs face resource constraints in terms of time and cognitive
abilities if they have a wide span of control. This acts as a stumbling block on establishment growth, as the
CEO has to invest costly resources such as time and effort to manage and decide upon complex business
operations. Delegation then reduces the overload of CEOs and frees resources necessary for expansion.9
2.4.2 Trust and shirking in team work
When individual contributions in team production are unobservable and the team members’ remuneration
is linked to overall team output, individuals have an incentive to free-ride on their colleagues (Alchian and
Demsetz, 1972; Holmstrom, 1982). As suggested by its definition, civic capital plays an important role in
reducing individual shirking in collective endeavors. Ichino and Maggi (2000) show in the Italian context
that shirking, defined as absenteeism and misconduct, is higher in the low civic capital regions in the South.
Becker and Murphy (1992) illustrate how uncooperative behavior in team work reduces the size of plants.
In their model firm output is the cooperative outcome of a team of workers. In order to produce a unit
of final output, a given number of complementary tasks has to be performed. As both workers and tasks
are assumed to be identical, each worker performs an equally large set of tasks. The working time of
each member consists in acquiring task-specific skills and then performing the production tasks. As the
8See p. 538.
9Chandler (1962) provides historical evidence that the growth of several North-American corporations was spurred by the
creation of separated divisions within firms and the corresponding delegation of decision authority to subordinates.
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size of the team increases, each worker performs a smaller set of tasks which increases its proficiency in
production (for example, due to learning by doing). On the other hand, as specialization increases, so
does the probability that the production chain collapses as the demand for coordination increases in the
number of workers. Optimal team size is then given by the trade-off between gains from specialization and
coordination costs. In a framework like Becker and Murphy (1992), civic capital can be thought to reduce
shirking and coordination costs, and to allow for larger teams.
2.4.3 Trust and cooperation in one-shot transactions
Relational contracts play an important role in governing intra-firm relationships (Baker et al., 2002). If
employees interact frequently, the threat to terminate the relationship in the case of defection acts as an
effective enforcement device. In particular, as long as the discounted gains from future trade outweigh
short-run benefits from defection, agents have an incentive to stick to informal agreements. However,
the frequency of interactions between two given employees depends on the size of the plant. In large
establishments in which production is fragmented into numerous divisions, the probability that agents
interfere with “strangers” is much larger than in smaller ones. Hence, the role of reputation and implicit
contracts decreases because interactions are less likely to be repeated. Again, if transactions take place in
trusting environments, cooperative outcomes can be sustained even if the game is not repeated (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2002).10
2.4.4 Testable implications
These considerations allow us to derive our main working hypotheses. First of all, the discussion above
makes clear why we expect that, in areas where the stock of civic capital is high, plants should be larger. As
to the standard deviation of average size, the way it may react to civic capital is very much in line with the
way market size increases the standard deviation in the theoretical model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
If in areas where civic capital is high we have a larger average size of plants, this may also bring an increase
in the standard deviation due to the direct magnifying effect on the size distribution. We will describe more
concretely this issue in the discussion of the empirical results.
The second implication of our framework is that we expect some heterogeneity in the impact of civic
capital on the plant size distribution across different industries. Specifically, we expect industries where
there is an intense interaction among workers to be more reactive to the stock of local civic capital. The
reason simply lies on the fact that the mechanisms of how civic capital affects relationships at the level of
plants are firmly grounded in interpersonal contacts. Conversely, we expect plants where the production
process is based on standardized routines and automation to be less sensitive to civic capital.11
10When explaining differences in the size of firms across countries, Fukuyama (1995) stresses this important property of
trust.
11Automation is the use of control systems and information technologies to reduce the need for the intervention of human
work in the production of goods and services.
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2.5 Data and variables
In this section, we describe the different data sources used. We then discuss in detail the procedure that we
follow to build the variables. First of all, let us describe the industrial and geographic scales we work with.
Industries are classified according to the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European
Community (NACE), rev. 1. We work with a disaggregation at the 4-digit level, which classifies the entire
spectrum of economic activity into 503 different industries. We keep in the sample only establishments
which are owned by private entities, and we exclude establishments owned by non-profit organizations and
public institutions.12
Concerning the geographic disaggregation, we work with the 103 Italian provinces existing in 2001.13
We work with provinces, and not with smaller spatial units, because data on civic capital are not available
at a smaller level of geography. However, working with provinces is particularly convenient provided that
it allows us to have a sufficiently large number of observations for each 4-digit industry.14
2.6 Plant size distribution
The data on plant size come from the 8th Census of Industry and Services carried out by the Italian national
statistic authority (Istat) in 2001, covering the universe of Italian establishments. In the Census, plants
are classified into 12 different size bins, according to the size of the plant in terms of workers.15 For each
province and each industry, the data set then provides information on the total number of plants and the
total number of workers in a given size bin.16
Let us now turn to the description of the dependent variables that we employ in the analysis. Following
Kumar et al. (1999) and Laeven and Woodruff (2007), the first dependent variable that we define is the
weighted average of plant size in 4-digit industry i and province j. In formal terms we compute average
plant size (APS) as:
APSi,j =
n∑
b=1
(
Nempb,i,j
Nestabb,i,j
)
×
(
Nempb,i,j
Nempi,j
)
, (1)
where Nempb,i,j is the total number of workers in bin b, industry i, and province j, N
estab
b,i,j is the total number
of plants in a given bin-province-industry, while Nempi,j is the total number of workers in industry i and
province j for all size bins. Hence, in this formula we weight the average size per bin, as given by the first
fraction in equation (1), by the share of workers working in that bin over the total number of workers in
the province-industry. The literature has emphasized that the rationale for this weighting scheme is to put
more weight on those plants which carry out the bulk of economic activity in a given province-industry, and
to weaken the impact on average plant size of a large number of small plants.
12This choice implies that are excluded from the analysis industries where plants are exclusively managed by non-profit or
government institutions, like health, social services and public administration.
13Italian provinces correspond to the NUTS 3 partitioning.
14The average number of observations for each industry is 70, which amounts to say that, on average, a 4-digit industry can
be found in 70 provinces out of a total of 103.
15The bin categories are the following: bin number 1 (0 workers), 2 (1 worker), 3 (2 workers), 4 (3-5 workers), 5 (6-9), 6
(10-19), 7 (20-49 workers), 8 (50-99), 9 (100-199), 10 (200-499), 11 (500-999), 12 (1000 and more).
16The information about plant size in the Istat Census is similar to the one provided in the County Business Patterns for
the U.S. County Business Patterns data are used, for example, in Holmes and Stevens (2002).
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In the robustness checks, we also consider a simplified version of (1), in which each size bin is weighted
by the share of firms in that bin:
APSi,j =
n∑
b=1
(
Nempb,i,j
Nestabb,i,j
)
×
(
Nestabb,i,j
Nestabi,j
)
=
Nempi,j
Nestabi,j
. (2)
This amounts to a simple division of the total number of workers by the total number of plants for each
province-industry combination. We refer to APSi,j as the simple average plant size. Moreover, we will
also look at the effect of civic capital on total employment in the province-industry, Nempi,j , on the total
number of establishments, Nestabi,j , and on the number of establishments above or below the 20 employees
size threshold.
The other feature of the size distribution of plants in a given province-industry that we want to charac-
terize is the degree of dispersion around the mean. For this reason, we consider a set of regressions where
the dependent variable is the standard deviation of weighted plant size in industry i and province j. It is
defined as:
SDPSi,j =
√√√√ n∑
b=1
[(
Nempb,i,j
Nestabb,i,j
)
−APSi,j
]2
×
(
Nempb,i,j
Nempi,j
)
. (3)
This variable puts more weight in the computation of dispersion on the size bins that carry out the bulk
of economic activity in a given province-industry. The counterpart of (2) which will be employed in the
robustness section is:
SDPSi,j =
√√√√ n∑
b=1
[(
Nempb,i,j
Nestabb,i,j
)
−APSi,j
]2
×
(
Nestabb,i,j
Nestabi,j
)
. (4)
Finally, notice that in the baseline analysis a given industry in a given province is included in the final
sample only if at least three plants are located there.17
In order to highlight the difference between the weighting schemes employed, Figure 1 provides a graph-
ical representation of the empirical size distribution of plants. The two graphs show the size distribution
for the Manufacture of Tools (Nace rev. 1 code 2862) in two provinces of Tuscany, Siena and Pistoia.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Size bins are plotted on the horizontal axis, with the value on top of the bars indicating average plant
size in that bin; that is, Nempb,i,j /N
estab
b,i,j . On the vertical axis we measure the value of the weight given to
the bins. For each bin, the two bars correspond to the two different weights. The dark gray bars provide
the weights based on employees, as in equations (1) and (3). The light gray bars provide the weights based
on the number of establishments, as in equations (2) and (4). By putting more weight on large plants,
the employee-based weighting scheme increases both the average and standard deviation of plant size. For
example, in Siena APS is 18.04, while APS is halved in magnitude, taking the value of 9.3. As for the
standard deviation, SDPS is 10.42, and SDPS is 9.02. The idea behind our paper is to assess whether,
for provinces belonging to the same region (say, Tuscany) and the same 4-digit industry (say, Manufacture
of Tools) we can establish if part of the change in the plant size distributions like those of Figure 1 can be
attributed to the variation in the stock of civic capital at the provincial level.
17The rationale for this choice is to exclude observations where the dependent variable is computed from very few plants. In
the robustness and sensitivity analysis we also include observations based on one or two plants only.
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The maps displayed in Figure 2 and 3 show the geographic variation of APS and SDPS across Italian
provinces.
[Insert Figures 2, 3 about here]
Not surprisingly, APS is the highest in the metropolitan areas of Milan, Rome and Turin. Moreover,
the map reveals that average plant size is generally larger in the Northern part of the country. This
pattern is even more evident in the case of the dispersion in plant size, as shown in Figure 3. The three
metropolitan areas just mentioned stand out, and the higher frequency of light-gray-colored provinces in
the North reveals a substantial North-South difference in the dispersion of plant size. The only three
light-gray-colored provinces in the South pertain to the metropolitan areas of Naples, Bari and Palermo.
2.7 Measurement of civic capital
We employ several proxies to measure the stock of civic capital in a given province. These are blood
donations and the number of volunteers in non-profit organizations, both standardized by population, and
electoral participation in referenda over the period between 1946 and 1987.18 Although quite different, all
three activities share common properties which make them suitable proxies for the stock of civic capital in
a province. First, individuals who donate blood, participate in volunteering or vote incur a non-negligible
cost. These costs often exceed the mere opportunity cost of time devoted to each of these activities.19
Second, and most important, none of these activities provide financial or legal incentives, so individuals do
not obtain any economic pay-off. Rather, individuals who donate blood, engage in volunteering, or vote
in referenda express a concern for some common good, triggered either by social preferences or by social
pressure.20 As outlined in section 2.2, the diffusion of these traits among the local population accounts for
the stock of civic capital in a province.
Figures 4, 5, 6 show the geographic distribution of blood donation, volunteering and electoral turnout,
respectively. All three maps reveal that civic capital is higher in the Central and Northern part of the
country.
[Insert Figures 4, 5, 6 about here]
Table 1 provides evidence that there exists a pronounced positive correlation between each of the three
proxies. The relationships are roughly equally strong in magnitude but nevertheless far from being perfect.
Despite broad common patterns, the maps reveal some differences. This indicates that none of the three
proxies can be taken as a precise measure of the stock of local civic capital. Rather, each variable is
blurred by idiosyncratic factors which induce a certain geographic participation pattern, although they are
orthogonal to the prevalence of civic capital.21
18In Appendix 2.21 we provide a detailed description of the variables and their sources.
19For example, donating blood imposes a substantial physical limitation in the short-run, voting requires information gath-
ering and personal evaluation of alternatives.
20See Putnam (1993) p. 93 for reasons why turnout referenda is more suitable than participation in “normal” political
elections. For a general motivation of the choice of electoral turnout to proxy civic capital see again Putnam (1993).
21For example, let us think to the 1987 referenda, dealing with some laws regulating the installation of nuclear plants in
Italy, which assumed in the political debate the status of a vote against the use of nuclear energy. It is well known that the
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[Insert Table 1 about here]
In order to remove the noise, we look at the common component of the three proxies. The last row in
Table 1 shows the correlation of the three proxies with their first principal component.22 The fact that the
correlation with each of the individual trust variables is strong, with only slight differences in magnitude,
suggests that all three proxies have a pronounced common dimension. Put differently, the first principal
component identifies the behavioral attitude of the local population that simultaneously underlies the choice
of whether to donate blood, participate on a voluntary basis in non-profit organizations, or vote in referenda;
that is, it identifies the values and beliefs that account for the stock of civic capital.23
Figure 7 shows the geographic distribution across Italian provinces of the measure of civic capital based
on the first principal component. As before, we find that civic capital is the highest in regions in the Center-
North, like Emilia-Romagna, and the lowest in the Southern mainland and Sicily. However, it is important
to stress that our identification strategy relies on the variation of civic capital at the provincial level within
Italian regions, because we will introduce in the empirical analysis dummy variables at the regional level.
Figure 8 illustrates this variation within regions. Specifically, the map shows the residuals from a regression
of the principal component of civic capital on a set of regional dummies. The fact that provinces with
very high and very low residuals, as evidenced by white and black-colored areas, are dispersed all over the
country indicates that the variation of civic capital that we exploit is equally pronounced in all parts of
Italy.
[Insert Figures 7, 8 about here]
In the analysis we also use historical variables of civic capital as instruments. The first historical measure
is the number of mutual aid societies in 1873, standardized by population. These predominantly urban
associations served craftsmen and artisans as a form of insurance against economic and social calamities.
The second measure is average electoral turnout in elections during the period 1919-1921. Both variables
are available at the regional level.24 The last historical instrument is related to the type of early political
institutions that were prevalent in the territory of a given province in 1300. More specifically, we employ
the number of cities in each province that were free city-states in the year 1300. This variable is based on
data from Guiso et al. (2008a).25 In section 2.16 we justify the choice of these variables as instruments for
current civic capital.
local population is strongly against the presence of nuclear plants in his own territory (this is sometimes referred to as the
‘nimby’ syndrome). Then, participation rates in 1987 referenda across Italian provinces could be driven by the presence of
nuclear plants in the territory, in addition to the stock of civic capital.
22In Appendix 2.22 we briefly review how to derive the first principal component.
23Another example where the first principal component is used to summarize common cultural traits at the regional level is
Tabellini (2010).
24For a detailed description consult the Appendix 2.21 and Putnam (1993).
25The authors, in order to reduce the cost of collecting historical data at the town level, analyze the history of only the 400
biggest cities in terms of 1871 population in the area that was under the Holy Roman Empire at the beginning of the second
Millennium (basically, the Center-North of Italy). For this reason, in the analysis with this set of instruments we are forced to
drop observations from the South Italy and from the Islands (Sicily and Sardinia).
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2.8 Other explanatory variables
The size distribution of establishments may be affected by a wide range of factors. For this reason, we
control for as many determinants as possible.26 The first control variable that we consider is the size of
the local market. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show in a monopolistically competitive model with firm
heterogeneity that average firm size (both in terms of output and sales) is larger in bigger markets. This
theoretical result is in accordance with the empirical findings for the U.S. (Syverson, 2004; Campbell and
Hopenhayn, 2005). In addition, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show that the dispersion of the plant size
distribution should increase with market size. We use two variables for the dimension of the local market.
The first is given by the provincial population, weighted by the relevance of final demand for that particular
industry, as derived from the Italian Input-Output Use tables.27 The second measure is provincial gross
domestic product.
The degree of urbanization could be correlated with the plant size distribution: even after controlling
for the intensity of final demand, plant size could still be the outcome of the overall degree of urbaniza-
tion.28 Correlation between the plant size distribution and urbanization could also go through the different
geographic characteristics of the provinces, even within the same region. This translates into nature-given
starting or stumbling blocks for economic activity, and might confound our results. Urbanization in 1861 is
supposed to capture such time-constant provincial characteristics.29
Another possible determinant of the size distribution is the local stock of human capital. We see human
capital as an outcome of education. For this reason our regressions control for the share of university
graduates in the population of a given province.
Next, we take the efficiency of the legal system into account, understood as the quality of contract
enforcement. Working on Mexican regions, Laeven and Woodruff (2007) show that firm size is increasing
with the quality of the legal system. We proxy the quality of the legal system computing the average number
of days it took to complete first-degree trials in labor-related affairs which ended in 2001, in each of the 165
Italian labor courts.
Apart from the direct link through contract enforcement, formal institutions influence the size of eco-
nomic organizations through the development of financial markets (Beck and Levine, 2003; La Porta et al.,
1997): well-functioning financial markets allow firms to grow and to increase in terms of size.30 As in
Benfratello et al. (2008) we use the number of bank branches per province, normalized by population, as a
proxy for the degree of financial development.
Finally, we investigate whether the impact of civic capital on the plant size distribution is heterogeneous
across industries. To this end, we characterize the production process of each industry according to the
intensity in human interactions. To quantify this dimension we have picked up the capital-labor ratio at the
26A detailed description of the data and the corresponding sources is provided in Appendix 2.21
27See Appendix 2.21 for further details.
28A classical reference linking plant growth and urbanization is Jacobs (1969).
29It will be explained below that picking historical urbanization is also particularly convenient for the first stage of our
instrumental variables approach, where we regress civic capital on historical instruments and other regressors.
30However Rajan and Zingales (1998) point out that developed financial markets not only allow firms to grow faster, but
also increase the birth rate of new firms, which are generally quite small. Hence, the overall effect of financial development on
firm size is a priori ambiguous.
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four-digit industry level. We believe that this is a good proxy to measure the sensitivity of a given industry
to human relations, or, symmetrically, the extent to which it depends on standardized routines and process
automation.
In Table 2 we provide the full set of descriptive statistics for our data.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
2.9 The effect of civic capital: OLS results
2.10 Average plant size
We begin the regression analysis with the ordinary least squares estimation of the relationship between
average plant size and civic capital. The equation that we estimate is the following:
lnAPSi,j = α0 + α1 lnCCj + lnX ′jα2 + γr + γi + i,j (5)
where lnAPSi,j is the logarithm of employment-weighted average plant size in province j and industry i,
lnCCj is the log of the measure of civic capital in province j, lnXj is the log of a vector of provincial
controls, γr denotes the region’s dummy, γi is a 4-digit unobserved industry effect, and i,j is the error
term.31 We apply to equation (5) a fixed effect analysis, in the sense that we interpret our data set as a
panel, where observations pertaining to a given industry i are collected repeatedly over different provinces.
During the statistical inference process, we take into account the potential correlation among the regression
error terms using standard errors that are clustered both at the provincial level and at the industry level.32
Results confirm our hypothesis that the level of civic capital is positively correlated with average plant
size. In columns from (1) to (4) of Table 3 we regress average plant size on four different civic capital
variables: blood donations, volunteers, electoral turnout in referenda, and the first principal component of
all these three measures. Except for the case of the referenda turnout, the results are always statistically
significant. The coefficient is most precisely estimated when the principal component is used. This is what
we expected, given that the motivation to extract the first principal component is getting an accurate
measure of civic capital out of the three proxy variables. In addition to the region dummy variables, the
only control that is added at the provincial level in these estimates is the strength of final demand. Also final
demand turns out to affect positively average plant size. The latter result is in accordance with theoretical
models such as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and empirical analyses such as Syverson (2004), Campbell and
Hopenhayn (2005) and Laeven and Woodruff (2007).
31When we measure civic capital by the principal component our equation is the following:
lnAPSi,j = α0 + α1PCj + lnX
′
jα2 + γr + γi + i,j .
Here PCj is the principal component of the log of the three proxy variables, rather than the log of some variable.
32The two-way clustering procedure that we adopt tackles two issues. On the one side, the correlation between error terms
within provinces could be the result of disturbances at the local level, which could descend, for instance, from unobservable
provincial characteristics. On the other side, the correlation in the error terms within industries could still survive the inclusion
of the fixed effects γi. Think, for example, to some random event that led some big plants in an industry to locate in some
province. This could induce correlation in the error terms for observations in that particular industry. On inference with
clustered data see Cameron and Miller (2010).
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In columns from (5) to (8) of Table 3 we include additional determinants of plant size at the provincial
level. In order to claim that civic capital increases plant size by increasing trust and cooperation at the plant
level, we have to exclude that results are driven by certain characteristics of the environment in which a
plant operates that are correlated with both civic capital and the plant size distribution. These confounding
factors are dealt with by including appropriate provincial controls, described in section 2.8.
Turning to the results, they show little sensitivity to the inclusion of controls. This is partially reassuring,
though of course it does not completely solve the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. With the exception of
referenda turnover, both the number of blood donations and that of volunteers are still statistically significant
at the 5% level. The same is true for the first principal component, which is statistically significant at the
1% level. It should be kept in mind that the coefficient α1 is actually an elasticity, because both the
dependent variable and the regressors are logarithms. Then, in the case of blood donations, an estimated
elasticity equal to 0.07 means that a 10% increase in the number of blood donations at the provincial level is
associated to a 0.7% increase in weighted average size of plants at the level of 4-digit industries. The value
is very similar in the case of volunteers. It is only in the case of the referenda turnover that the coefficient
is no longer significant. This fact can be taken as evidence that, once the regional effects are washed out
by the dummy variables, γr, there is not enough variability left in provincial turnout to allow a coefficient
estimate which is statistically different from zero.33 The following example gives an idea of the economic
magnitude of the effect of civic capital when the measure is the first principal component. Milan is a high
civic capital province (it ranks 21st in Italy), while Naples is the province with the lowest civic capital in
Italy. The estimated coefficient equal to 0.05 implies that average plant size would be 25% larger if Naples
had the stock of civic capital of Milan.34 This is a sizeable impact given that the observed difference is such
that plants are, on average, 47% larger in Milan.
Among the provincial controls, a coefficient being different from zero in a statistically significant way is
the number of bank branches. The fact that we get a negative sign can be explained by a certain prevalence
of younger and, for this reason, smaller plants were financial development is higher.35 In our estimates the
role of civic capital seems to outweigh that of formal institutions, since the quality of contract enforcement,
expressed by the length of trials, is no longer statistically different from zero.
33When the proxy of civic capital is the first principal component of the above mentioned three variables, it is less straight-
forward to provide an interpretation in terms of elasticity of the coefficient of civic capital. As we outline in Appendix 2.22, the
extraction of the principal component is a statistical procedure whose output, starting from the log of our three proxies, is a
variable which has no observable counterpart. However, we think that this procedure is particular appropriate in a framework
as ours where we want to identify in the most accurate way the common behavioral attitude of the local population toward
trusting others, and in view of this a certain artificiality of the measure can be tolerated.
34The principal component for Naples is -3.347, while for Milan it is +1.236. The contribution from the difference in civic
capital to the difference of average plant size in log terms for the two locations (lnAPSi,Milan− lnAPSi,Naples) is then equal
to 0.229, which corresponds to a difference of 25% in terms of average size measured in levels.
35However, this control variable could be endogenous in equation (5). Guiso et al. (2004) stress the importance of civic
capital for the development of financial markets in the Italian context.
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2.11 Standard deviation of plant size
Our empirical analysis proceeds with the estimation of the link between the standard deviation of plant size
and civic capital. The equation that we estimate is now the following:
lnSDPSi,j = α0 + α1 lnCCj + lnX ′jα2 + γr + γi + i,j (6)
where lnSDPSi,j is the logarithm of the standard deviation of plant size in industry i and province j,
computed according to equation (3). As before, we perform a fixed effect analysis where the panel dimension
is in terms of 4-digit industries.
The results provided in Table 4, in the columns from (1) to (4), are obtained with just one provincial
control (final demand). In columns from (5) to (8) we add the full set of controls. The following results
stand out. As before, all proxies of civic capital are statistically significant, with the exception of electoral
turnout in referenda. Moreover, there is little sensitivity of the estimates with respect to the inclusion of
the full set of provincial controls. The elasticity of the standard deviation with respect to civic capital is
0.08 for blood donations and for volunteers.
The results suggest that the impact of civic capital, although smaller in magnitude, is qualitatively
similar to that of market demand: it increases both the first and the second moment of the distribution of
plant size. As to the other controls, financial development, measured by the number of bank branches, is
associated to a less dispersed distribution in terms of size (probably due to a larger number of small plants
in the province-industry, something which makes the distribution more even).
2.12 A graphical discussion of the results
In order to discuss our results, we go back to Figure 1, where the distribution for NACE 2862 in Siena and
Pistoia is plotted. We want to provide a stylized graphical interpretation of how civic capital shifts the
distribution of plant size. The two provinces are roughly equal in terms of overall size (measured by total
GDP) and belong to the same region (Tuscany). However, they differ markedly in the endowment of civic
capital. While Pistoia’s endowment ranks 42nd in Italy in terms of the first principal component, Siena has
the 3rd highest endowment. The figure highlights that civic capital increases the number of plants at the
top end of the distribution: comparing the height of the dark gray bar in size bin number 6 reveals that
relatively large plants are more frequent in Siena than in Pistoia. Moreover, Siena hosts establishments
which have no size counterpart in Pistoia (there is no plant in size bin number 7 in Pistoia). We do not
find such a pattern in the left tail: in size bins number 2, 3, and 4 (where the total number of employees is
small, ranging from 1 to 5), the distribution is actually fatter in Pistoia than in Siena.36
The mechanism we have in mind to explain why civic capital increases both average plant size and the
standard deviation of plant size is coherent with this stylized example. Our argument hinges upon a larger
mass of big plants being active in the local areas with high civic capital. This happens because of the
different channels outlined in the conceptual framework, and gives rise to a magnification of the local plant
size distribution which ultimately increases also the standard deviation of size. In the following section we
provide further evidence on this.
36Qualitatively, we get the same results looking at the light gray bars, where the weights are given by the number of plants
that each size bin contains.
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2.13 Extensions and robustness of the analysis
2.14 Heterogeneity across industries, and small vs. large plants
In Table 5, we show that the role of civic capital for the first and second moment of the plant size distribution
is not homogeneous across industries. In section 2.2 we have stressed the importance of civic capital for team
production and cooperative behavior in one-shot interactions. Consequently, we expect civic capital to be
more important in industries where the production process is more intensive in human interactions. To test
this, we have added an interaction term to our baseline specification where the first principal component of
civic capital is interacted with the capital-labor ratio measured at the 4-digit industry level.37 Accordingly,
the equation for APS becomes
lnAPSi,j = α0 + α1PCj + α2PCj × lnKLi + lnX ′jα3 + γr + γi + i,j (7)
where PCj is the value of the principal component in province j, and KLi is the capital-labor ratio of
industry i. The corresponding results are shown in columns (1) and (4) of Table 5. The negative estimate
for the coefficient α2 of the interaction between the capital-labor ratio and the measurement of civic capital
is in line with our reasoning: the magnitude of the impact of civic capital on the plant size distribution
decreases as the industry’s capital-labor ratio goes up. The explanation is that problems of coordination
and shirking behavior, which civic capital alleviates, are more important for output production in sectors
with a low degree of automation and a high intensity of human interactions.
In order to get a more precise picture of the heterogeneous effect of civic capital across industries we
evaluate the marginal effects for different values of the capital-labor ratio. The industry with the median
value of capital-labor intensity is Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags (lnKLi = 4.034). The estimate
of the marginal effect of civic capital on APS in this specific industry is positive and equal to 0.052.38
Performing an F-test on the linear restriction (α1 + α2 × 4.034) = 0 reveals that this effect is statistically
different from zero at the 1% level. Repeating this exercise, we find that the marginal effect of civic capital
is no longer different from zero at the 5% level only in the case of the top 15% industries in terms of the
capital-labor ratio. Hence, this exercise shows that civic capital seems to have no impact for the size of
plants only in industries which are very intensive in the use of capital.
Another simple partition of 4-digit industries can be obtained by grouping them in two different sets of
industries, namely manufacturing (Nace section D) and services (Nace sections from E onward). We then
ask whether manufacturing is any different from services. Results are again displayed in Table 5, in columns
(2), (3), (5) and (6). For both manufacturing and services, civic capital increases average plant size and the
standard deviation. The effect seems to be slightly more pronounced for manufacturing. It is interesting
to observe that the coefficients of the control variables such as historical urbanization, university graduates
and bank branches display substantial differences in both sign and significance among the two sectors.39
37See Appendix 2.21 for a description of the way the capital-labor ratio is obtained.
38To obtain the estimate of the impact of civic capital in a specific industry one simply needs the value for lnKLi, and the
estimates for α1 and α2. The value is then equal (α1 + α2 × lnKLi).
39Urbanization in 1861 and university graduates have a statistically significant positive coefficient in the regression for
services. This makes sense from an economic point of view, as long as larger plants in the service sector are located in more
urbanized areas, and service provision is comparatively more intensive in skilled workers, so that larger service providers can
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However, we can conclude that the positive effect of civic capital on both APS and SDPS is not driven by
a particular sector, be it manufacturing or services.
We then perform another exercise, testing, in two separate regressions, the impact of civic capital on the
log of total employment in a province-industry, and on the log of the total number of establishments. The
corresponding results, displayed in columns (7) and (8) of Table 5, provide evidence that there is a positive
effect on total employment, while the effect on the number of establishments is not statistically different
from zero. Taking the last regression as a starting point, we then ask whether there is some difference
between small and large plants. Our conceptual framework suggests that the cooperation-enhancing effect
of civic capital (working through a facilitation in the delegation of authority, a reduction in shirking, and
a higher propensity to cooperate in one-shot transactions) should be more important for the functioning of
large plants. On the contrary, in small establishments, cooperation can be sustained by other mechanisms
such as direct monitoring or kinship bonds. Moreover, in small plants interactions between workers become
more frequent, so that relational contracts are an efficient enforcement device. Therefore, we expect that
especially the number of large plants should be raised by civic capital. In order to address this question, we
count for each province-industry the number of plants with less than twenty employees (small plants), and
those with at least twenty employees (large plants).40 The results are presented in columns (9) and (10) of
Table 5, and point to a positive effect of civic capital which is statistically different from zero in the case of
large plants only. The point estimate is larger when the dependent variable is the number of big plants.41
This is in line with our conceptual framework.
2.15 Further robustness and sensitivity checks
Other robustness checks that we have performed are provided in Table 6. The first five columns present
the result for APS, while the last five present the result for SDPS. In columns (1) and (6) the dependent
variable is the average plant size of equation (2), and the standard deviation of equation (4), respectively.
Although somewhat reduced in magnitude, the effect of civic capital is still positive and significant. We can
conclude that our results are not driven by the choice of the weighting scheme in the construction of the
dependent variables.
In columns (2) and (7) we check whether results are affected by the number of variables we employ in
the computation of the first principal component. Specifically, one may wonder whether excluding referenda
turnout (whose coefficient is not statistically significant when we employ it as a measure of civic capital)
from the computation of the first principal component affects the results. We prove that this is not the case.
Again, the estimated coefficients are just slightly smaller in magnitude than in the baseline regressions.
be expected to locate where many college graduates live. The number of bank branches is negatively related to APS and SDPS
only in manufacturing.
40The choice of this threshold is arbitrary. We have tried with other size thresholds such as 50 employees and the results do
not change.
41Since the number of plants above or below a certain size threshold in a province-industry is a count variable, this analysis
is suitable for a Poisson regression. In this case, the routine in Stata allows only for one-way clustering in the standard errors
(in terms of 4-digit industries). This notwithstanding, the results are qualitatively close to the one presented in the table,
and point to an impact of civic capital which is larger in magnitude in the case of large plants, with the coefficient still being
statistically different from zero at the 1% level.
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In columns (3) and (8) we add yet another provincial control, namely GDP in 2001. The inclusion of
GDP reduces the statistical significance of the other controls such as final demand. However, the estimates
related to the impact of civic capital are affected in a negligible manner.
In columns (4) and (9) we consider the full set of available observations. We mentioned previously that
we exclude from the baseline regressions those observations where the dependent variable is based just on
one or two plants. In these columns we check whether adding these observations to the sample changes the
results in some manner. The actual change is tiny.
Finally, in columns (5) and (10) we run regressions after excluding the provinces of Rome, Milan and
Turin. As we show in Figures 2 and 3, these are the provinces with the highest average size and the highest
standard deviation of size. Therefore, it could be that our results are driven by them. Our estimates prove
that their exclusion from the sample bears no particular change to our results.
2.16 The effect of civic capital: evidence from 2SLS estimation
2.17 Motivation and identifying assumptions
Apart from problems of measurement error in our main explanatory variable that we have addressed com-
puting the first principal component of three different proxies of civic capital, there are other reasons which
might prevent us from interpreting results in Tables 3 and 4 as causal. Consider the case of reverse causa-
tion. If a large plant locates in a province average plant size increases, and, arguably, the local population
is economically better off. As a consequence of this improvement in material well-being, individuals develop
civic virtues, i.e. they donate blood, vote in referenda and engage as volunteers. Moreover, although we
control for a range of confounding factors, we cannot completely exclude that other omitted variables bias
our estimates.
In order to prove that our results are neither driven by omitted variables nor by reversed causality,
we provide evidence from two-stage least square estimates. The first set of instruments are lagged proxy
variables of civic capital, namely members of mutual aid societies in 1873, and electoral turnout around the
1920s, similarly to Buonanno et al. (2009) and de Blasio and Nuzzo (2010). The second set of instruments
goes even further back in time. It relies on Putnam (1993), who argues that the huge differences in the
endowment of civic capital across Italian regions can be traced back to different political regimes prevailing
at the beginning of the second millennium. In particular, he stresses the role of free-city states that emerged
in the Center-North of the Italian peninsula. Testing Putnam (1993)’s theory, Guiso et al. (2008a) shows
that the free-city state experience has a causal effect on the accumulation of civic capital.
We have good reasons to believe that these historical measures are highly correlated with the current
stock of civic capital. The literature has stressed the persistence of civic capital over long periods of time,
highlighting the crucial role of intergenerational transmission of values and beliefs from parents to their
offspring (Tabellini, 2008; Guiso et al., 2008b). Hence, the stock of today’s civic capital in a certain local
area can be explained to a large extent by historical values of civic capital in that area. The high persistence
of civic capital over time translates, as we show below, into a strong first stage relationship.
The other requirement for the validity of our instruments is that they must be uncorrelated with the error
term i,j in equations (5) and (6) for APS and SDPS. This amounts to saying that, conditional on the other
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regressors, the historical instrumental variables have had no direct effect on the first and second moment
of the plant size distribution. This could be a somewhat strong assumption, as our historical instruments
might have affected current economic development and hence current plant size through channels other than
the current stock of civic capital. In order to address this threat, we include the log of provincial GDP as an
additional regressor in all 2SLS specifications. The rationale is that this variable captures all the possible
effects of the historical instrumental variables on the plant size distribution that work through economic
development. This makes us more confident that the exclusion restriction is not violated.
2.18 Results
2.18.1 Civic capital in the 19th and early 20th century
The first set of instruments dates back to the middle of the 19th and early 20th century. The 19th century
experienced a unusual movement in popular sociability, not only in Italy but in whole Western Europe. As
a response to the new economic and social calamities brought about by the process of industrialization,
traditional associations like guilds and religious societies were replaced by more civic, charitable and educa-
tional organizations. One prominent manifestation of this new collectivism was the creation of mutual aid
societies. Their members enjoyed benefits such as medical care, insurance against work accidents and basic
instruction. Importantly, the functioning of mutual aid societies relied solely on the principle of reciprocity:
absent any kind of formal enforcement and coordination, their members joined individual forces for mutual
benefit. Putnam (1993) describes them as “a locally organized, underfunded, self-help version of what the
twentieth century would call the welfare state”. Therefore, the membership rate in mutual aid societies in
an area is a good proxy for the stock of local civic capital. The year to which this information refers to is
1873.
The second measure of civic capital is electoral turnout in the 1920s. Specifically, we average turnout
over four political elections: national elections from 1919 and 1921 and provincial and communal elections
from 1920. The choice of these elections is dictated by the fact that they were the only elections with
universal suffrage before the advent of fascism.
Using lagged proxy variables of civic capital we again have to exclude reverse causation. In other words,
the pattern of civic capital in the past should not be the outcome of economic well-being at that time. We
address this issue by analyzing the relationship between urbanization rate in 1861, which relates to economic
development at that time, and the two instruments.42 The correlation coefficient between past urbanization
and members of mutual aid societies is -0.05. This implies that for the year 1873 we have, if anything, a
negative relationship between civic capital and material well-being. Consequently, we are confident that this
measure of civic capital is exogenous from the point of view of our analysis. As for turnout in the 1920s,
the correlation coefficient is -0.24.43 We also run a robustness check in which we instrument civic capital
42It is Tabellini (2010) who argues that past urbanization is a good proxy for past economic development. In any case, we
signal that some caution has to be paid when dealing with historical urbanization in the context of Southern Italy. As explained
by Malanima (2005), in 1861 many big cities in Southern Italy were actually agrotowns, since a large share of inhabitants was
employed in agriculture, and not in manufacturing or services.
43However, this negative relationship is less reliable for our purposes, as we are comparing urbanization rate in 1861 with
the measure of civic capital 60 years later.
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only by the membership rate in mutual aid societies in 1873.
Our potentially endogenous variable (the current level of civic capital, as given by the principal compo-
nent) is expressed in the following way in the first stage regression:
PCj = ω0 + ω1 lnCCAidr + ω2 lnCC
Turn
r + lnX
′
jω3 + γmr + j , (8)
where lnCCAidr is the stock of civic capital in region r proxied by the log of the membership in mutual
aid societies in 1873 (normalized by population), while lnCCTurnr is the log of average regional turnout of
elections in the 1920s. These two terms are meant to capture the persistent component of civic capital. Since
these measures are only available at the regional level we cannot include regional dummy variables. Instead,
we replace them with macro-region dummies, γmr.44 The vector lnX ′j contains all provincial covariates,
including provincial GDP.
The bottom part of Table 7 (Panel B) contains the results from the first stage. Column (2) refers to
APS, while (6) refers to SDPS. The coefficient estimates of both instruments have the expected positive
sign and are statistically different from zero. Moreover, the instruments explain a very large share of the
variation in current civic capital, as evidenced by the high first-stage R2. Given the high persistence of civic
capital across time, this comes as no surprise. As for the other covariates, it is important to stress the role of
urbanization in 1861 in equation (8). As mentioned by Putnam (1993), mutual aid societies predominantly
served craftsmen and artisans in cities as a form of insurance against economic and social calamities. As
such, they were mostly an urban phenomenon. Hence, including historical urbanization in 1861 among the
regressors improves the reliability of the instruments as it controls for the degree of urbanization at that
period, something which might confound the results.45
Results from the second stage are depicted in Panel A of Table 7. In order to provide comparable OLS
results, we have re-estimated equation (5) with macro-region instead of region dummies. The corresponding
results are shown in columns (1) and (5). As for the 2SLS estimates, they are qualitatively similar to the
OLS results. The coefficient of civic capital is positive and statistically different from zero at the 1% level.
For both APS and SDPS the 2SLS estimates for civic capital are larger than their OLS counterparts. Given
our concerns of reversed causality and omitted variables, this is not necessarily what we expected. Actually,
if results in Tables 3 and 4 were driven by reversed causality, then the 2SLS coefficients should have been
lower than the OLS coefficients from columns (1) and (5). Two possible reasons might explain the increase
of 2SLS estimates with respect to the OLS ones. First, despite the computation of the principal component,
civic capital could still be measured with error. The 2SLS helps removing the attenuation bias. Second,
the increase in the estimates may be a sign of violation of the exclusion restriction. Given that we have
more than one instrument we can perform a test of overidentification to assess this issue. The p-value of the
test statistic is reported at the bottom of Panel A. It is sufficiently high in order to reject the alternative
hypothesis, according to which at least one of the two instruments is not exogenous. Hence, the data support
the assumption that the exclusion restriction is not violated.46
44The macro-regions are five: North-West, North-East, Center, South, Islands.
45Actually, we get a negative relationship between historical urbanization and the current level of civic capital in the first
stage. This mirrors the negative correlations that we have shown above between historical urbanization and past civic capital.
46The test statistics have to be interpreted with caution, though. While testing the exogeneity of, say, the number of mutual
aid societies in 1873, the overidentification test explicitly assumes that the other instrument, turnout in the 1920s, is truly
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In columns (3) and (7) we consider an alternative specification where the membership rate in mutual
aid societies is the only instrument for our two-stages approach. The first stage relationship remains strong.
As for the second stage result, there is hardly any change with respect to columns (2) and (6).
2.18.2 Free-city state experiences during the Middle Age
The second strategy to instrument the current level of civic capital relies on the number of free-city states
experiences that were present in the territory of each province in 1300. Putnam (1993) argues that the huge
differences in the endowment of civic capital across Italian regions are due to the emergence of free-city
states in the Center-North of the country in the Middle Age. Lacking any centralized form of government,
their citizens had to collaborate to provide solutions to problems of common interest, first and foremost to
defend their cities against foreign invaders. As a consequence, individuals developed a sense of cooperation
and concern for common issues resulting in a high stock of civic capital.
We exploit information on free-city states in 1300 provided by Guiso et al. (2008a). More specifically, for
each province, we count the number of cities that were a communal republic in the year 1300, which gives
a minimum of zero and a maximum of three free-city states per province.47 Figure 9 shows the number
of free-city states per province across Italy. The information is only available for the Center-North, so we
exclude the South and the Islands from this exercise.
In the first stage regression we plug three different dummy variables capturing the number of free-city
states (be it 1, 2 or 3). We exclude from the regression the dummy variable for the case when there are no
free-city states, which becomes our reference group. The specification in the first stage is the following:
PCj = ω0 + ω1City1j + ω2City
2
j + ω3City
3
j + lnX
′
jω4 + γmr + j (9)
where City1j , City
2
j , and City
3
j are the dummy variables for 1, 2, or 3 free-city states in the province,
respectively. The macro-region dummies and provincial covariates are also included. Columns (4) and (8)
in Panel B show that also these instruments are good predictors for the current level of civic capital. As
expected, ceteris paribus, provinces with one free-city state in 1300 display a higher level of civic capital
than provinces with no free-city states. The impact of having two free-city states in 1300 is even larger.
Performing an F-test reveals that the instruments are jointly significant (see the bottom part of Panel B).
Compared to the columns (2) and (6) the first-stage R2 is somewhat reduced.
The second stage results in Panel A show a positive and statistically significant effect of civic capital on
both average plant size and the standard deviation of size. Quantitatively, the estimates of civic capital are
very close to the OLS results.48 The p-values of the overidentification tests do not reveal any violation of
the exclusion restriction, neither for average size nor for the standard deviation of size.
exogenous. Therefore, the test cannot detect whether both instruments are invalid.
47Obviously, one needs to control for the size of the province since the number of free-city states could be a function of the
dimension of the province. This is achieved through the inclusion in the first stage of variables such as GDP, final demand,
urbanization in 1861. Notice that there are just three provinces with 3 free-city states (Alessandria, Cuneo and Turin) and
they are all located in Piedmont.
48When we drop the South and the Islands from the sample and re-run the regression specifications of columns (1) and (5)
of Table 7, we get a point estimate of 0.081 for APS and 0.105 for SDPS. Both estimates are statistically different from zero
at the 1% level. The comprehensive results are available upon request.
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2.19 Conclusion
Employing census data on establishments in Italy, we have shown how trust, captured by the geography of
civic capital, shapes the size distribution of plants. More specifically, our results reveal that trust increases
the average and the dispersion of the size distribution in 4-digit industries across provinces. The effect of
civic capital holds for both manufacturing and services, and is more important for industries relying more
heavily on labor as an input. Our econometric specifications address several potential threats. First, a set of
appropriate controls excludes that our results are driven by other determinants of plant size such as market
demand, financial development, human capital, judicial inefficiency and past urbanization. Moreover, fixed
effects at a highly disaggregated industry and spatial level are included. Third, we explicitly address the
sources of endogeneity of trust. On the one hand, extracting the first principal component of three well-
established measures of trust minimizes the problem of measurement error. On the other hand, the variation
of civic capital in the middle of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, and free-city state experiences
in 1300 serve as instruments for current trust. We get the conclusion that it is unlikely that our results are
driven by reversed causality or omitted variables bias.
Recently, Algan and Cahuc (2010) and Tabellini (2010) have established a causal effect of trust on
aggregate economic outcomes, such as per-capita GDP and growth rates. While these studies provide
important new insights, they do not suggest specific channels of how trust enhances the growth potential of
economies. Our study hints that one mechanism of how trust translates into growth might be that it allows
plants to grow large. Indeed, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that two thirds of industry growth can be
attributed to the growth in existing establishments rather than to the formation of new ones.
We think that more evidence is needed on the relation between trust and the growth of organizations.
Based on a cross-section, our analysis does not allow to derive dynamic patterns. Moreover, observing
shifts over time could uncover the impact of trust with respect to firm entry and exit. Another interesting
extension consists in identifying how trust precisely affects firm organization. We have presented several,
mutually not exclusive, channels without being able to identify the relative impact of each of them. In
order to open this black box, survey data which shed light on the decision making process and internal
organization of firms, such as those used in Bloom et al. (2009), are very promising.
2.20 Appendix
2.21 Detailed description of the data
2.21.1 Dependent variables
The construction of the dependent variables is described in detail in the main text. The information is
taken from the 8th Istat Census of Industry and Services, corresponding to the year 2001.
2.21.2 Measures or instruments for civic capital
Blood donations: The number of blood donations per 1000 inhabitants, disaggregated by province. The
data are collected from the health authorities of Italian regions. In each region, regional health authorities
collect data on blood donations and subsequently send this information to the Superior Institute of Health
(Istituto Superiore di Sanita`) which, in turn, maintains a National and Regional Registry of Blood and
Plasma. Provincial data on blood donations are not available for Apulia and Lazio. For the provinces of
these two regions we take the total regional value. Data refer to the year 2002 and the source is Cartocci
(2007) on data from the Superior Institute of Health.
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Volunteers: It is the number of volunteers in non-profit organizations. Data refer to the year 2000 and
the source is de Blasio and Nuzzo (2010).
Referenda turnout : It is the average provincial electoral turnout for the referenda on the choice between
republic and monarchy (1946), divorce (1974), public financing of political parties (1978), public security
and anti-terrorism measures (1981), abortion (1981), wage escalator regulations (1985) and nuclear power
and hunting regulations (1987). The following eight provinces were created after 1995: Biella, Lecco,
Lodi, Rimini, Prato, Crotone, Vibo Valentia, Verbano-Cusio-Ossola. The provinces to which they belonged
before 1995 and whose value has been assigned to them appear in parenthesis: Biella (Vercelli), Lecco (simple
average of Bergamo and Como), Lodi (Milan), Rimini (Forl`ı-Cesena), Prato (Firenze), Crotone (Catanzaro),
Vibo Valentia (Catanzaro), Verbano-Cusio-Ossola (Novara). The source of data for referendum turnout is
the Ministry of the Interior.
Mutual aid societies in 1873 : It is the number of the members in mutual aid societies in 1873 at the
regional level, standardized by 100,000 inhabitants. Data for Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige and Friuli-
Venezia Giulia are missing. We adopt the values of Piedmont for Valle d’Aosta, the region from where it
was split off. For the latter two regions, we adopt the values of Veneto, which is socio-geographically the
closest one. Additionally, there is no data for Molise, for which we take the value of Abruzzo, the region
from where it was split off. The source is Putnam (1993).
Turnout in 1920s: It is the average electoral turnout at the regional level in the national elections of
1919 and 1921, provincial elections in 1920 and communal elections in 1920. There is no data for the regions
of Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. We adopt the values of Piedmont for Valle
d’Aosta, the region from which it was split off. For the latter two regions, we adopt the values of Veneto,
which is socio-geographically the closest one. The source of these data is Putnam (1993).
Number of free-city states in 1300 : It is the number of free-city state experiences in the territory of each
province in 1300. Data are from Guiso et al. (2008a). In order to reduce the cost of collecting historical data
at the town level, the authors analyze the history of only the 400 biggest cities in terms of 1871 population
in the area that was under the Holy Roman Empire at the beginning of the second Millennium (basically,
the Center-North of Italy).
2.21.3 Other explanatory variables
Final demand : The variable is constructed as follows. First of all, we assign each 4-digit industry to the
corresponding 2-digit sector. For each 2-digit industry, we compute from Input-Output Use tables for Italy
the share of output being purchased by the final demand coming from households, public institutions and
non-profit organizations. This share is then multiplied by total provincial population to get an exact measure
of the dimension of the local market in terms of final demand for all the industries belonging to a given
2-digit sector (the variable then varies by 2-digit sector and by province). Both Input-Output Use tables
and provincial population are from Istat and are taken with reference to the year 2001.
Urbanization in 1861 : This variable is the share of total provincial population living in cities with more
than 10,000 inhabitants in 1861. Data on city size come from the “Italian Urban Population Database
1300-1861”, provided by Paolo Malanima (http://www.paolomalanima.it/default file/Page646.htm). The
number of total provincial population in 1861 is taken from Populstat (http://www.populstat.info/).
University graduates: It is the number of university graduates per province, divided by total provincial
population. The data refer to the year 2001 and are from Istat.
Bank branches: It is the number of bank branches per 1000 inhabitants, disaggregated by province. The
data refer to the year 2001 with the exception of the provinces of Vibo Valentia and Verbano-Cusio-Ossola.
For those two provinces, the values corresponding to the year 1998 are taken. The source of the data is the
Bank of Italy.
Length of labor trials: It is the number of days it takes to complete a first degree trial in labor affairs
in each of the 165 Italian labor courts. The data refer to the year 2001 and are provided by Istat in the
data base Territorial Information System on Justice (Sistema Informativo Territoriale sulla Giustizia). Since
there are more courts than provinces and since in some cases the territory of a court belongs to two different
provinces we proceed as follows. First, we assign to each city of the province the value of the court to which
the city belongs. This information is then averaged for all the cities belonging to the same province to get
a provincial variable.
GDP : It is the provincial nominal gross domestic product in 2001, expressed in thousands of euros. The
source is Istat.
Capital-labor ratio: It is calculated at the 4-digit industry level from the balance sheet data of 86,000
firms operating in Italy in 2001. For each firm, we compute the capital-labor ratio as the sum of tangible
and intangible assets (measured in thousands of euros) over the total number of employees. We then take
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the average value for all the firms belonging to the same industry. The data source is Bureau van Dijk’s
AIDA data set.
2.22 Derivation of the first principal component
The intuition of principal component analysis (PCA) in our context is the following: given the three proxies
of civic capital, each province corresponds to a point in a three dimensional vector space. The idea of PCA
is to find a linear combination of the three variables which re-expresses the original data set in such a way
that it captures most of the common variance. This linear combination corresponds to the first principal
component.
In general terms, the first principal component can be derived as follows (see Jolliffe, 2002): vector x
denominates the data consisting of p random variables (the three proxies of civic capital in our case) and
vector α1 consists of p constants, α11, α12, . . . α1p. Consider the linear function α′1x:
α′1x = α11x1 + α12x2 + . . .+ α1pxp =
p∑
j=1
α1jxj (10)
Finding the first principal component amounts to determine the elements of α1 which maximize the
variance of V ar[α′1x] = α
′
1Sα1, where S is the covariance matrix of x. The vector α1 is constrained to have
unit length, which implies that α′1α1 = 1. The corresponding Lagrange maximization function takes the
following form:
α′1Sα1 − λ(α′1α1 − 1). (11)
Maximizing (11) with respect to α1 gives
(S− λIp)α1 = 0, (12)
in which the Lagrange multiplier λ is the eigenvalue of S and the corresponding eigenvector is α1. Ip is
the p-dimensional identity matrix. Because the quantity to be maximized is α′1Sα1 = α
′
1λα1 = λ, the
eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue is chosen. The first principal component is then α′1x. In our data,
the highest eigenvalue takes the value of 2.48. The associated eigenvector explains 75% of the total variance.
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Table 1: Correlation among the proxy variables of civic capital
Referenda turnout (log) Volunteers (log) Blood donations (log)
Volunteers (log) 0.69 1
Blood donations (log) 0.61 0.57 1
Principal component 0.89 0.87 0.84
Note: The number of observations is 103. Blood donations is the log of the number of blood dona-
tions per 100,000 inhabitants inn 2002; Volunteers is the log of the number of volunteers in non-profit
institutions per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000; Referenda turnout is the log of the average electoral
turnout in referenda between 1946 and 1987; Principal component is the the first principal compo-
nent of the above mentioned three proxies of civic capital. All correlations are statistically different
from zero at the 1% level.
Figure 1: Empirical distribution of plant size in NACE industry 2862 (Manufacture of tools) in two provinces
of Tuscany (Siena and Pistoia). On the top of each couple of bars there is the average size of that bin, given
by the total amount of employment divided by the total amount of establishments.
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Figure 2: Average plant size, weighted by the number of employees in each size bin. Values are provincial
averages over 4-digit industries.
Figure 3: Standard deviation of size, weighted by the number of employees in each size bin. Values are
provincial averages over 4-digit industries.
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Figure 4: Blood donations per 1000 inhabitants.
Figure 5: Number of volunteers in non-profit organizations per 100,000 inhabitants.
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Figure 6: Electoral turnout in referenda, averaged over 7 referenda that took place between 1946 and 1987.
Figure 7: Map of civic capital measured by the first principal component of blood donations, volunteering,
and electoral turnout.
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Figure 8: Map of civic capital measured by the variation of the first principal component within regions.
The figure plots the residuals of a regression of the provincial principal component on regional dummies.
Figure 9: Number of free-city states by province in 1300 (Source: Guiso et al., 2008a). South of Italy and
Islands are not included.
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3 Chapter 2: Civic Capital, Firm Size and Purchased Service
Intensity in Italy
3.1 Introduction
Since Coase (1937), the determination of the boundaries of the firm has been studied extensively in the lit-
erature. An important theoretical approach is Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson (1979), Williamson
(1985), Williamson (1985), Williamson (1996)). Transaction Cost Economics (hereafter TCE) provides
testable predictions on whether a transaction takes place within the firm or on the market. Products which
require relationship-specific investments (because they are complex or are exchanged under uncertainty)
create contractual hazards between the parties when they are traded on the market. These hazards lead to
ex-post opportunistic renegotiation of the contract regulating the transaction. Hence, products requiring
relationship-specific investment are more likely to be exchanged within the firm. However, as Williamson
(1996) points out, not only product characteristics but also the environment in which a transaction takes
place determines the make-or-buy decision of firms. Specifically, he stresses the role for societal culture in
determining the extent of opportunistic behavior and hence the incidence of contractual hazards.
In this paper, we empirically test the prediction from TCE that a more opportunistic environment leads
to more vertical integration in the Italian context. We proxy the level of opportunism by the level of local
civic capital (Putnam (1993), Banfield (1958)) in each Italian province.49 Concerning vertical integration,
we focus on the purchase of a specific item, namely services. We analyze the extent to which firms produce
services in-house or acquire them on the market. This information is available at the firm level. In a way
quite similar to Holmes (1999), we measure vertical integration by the ratio of purchased services over sales.50
The choice of using services is dictated by several reasons. First, service transactions are strongly subject
to contract incompleteness, which make the specification of a well-defined contract ex ante cumbersome.
For example, quality is difficult to measure and heterogeneous, and this hampers the comparison of prices
and outputs. Moreover, service production is characterized by moral hazard due to asymmetric information
(DeBandt (1996)). Hence, according to TCE, the exchange of services is highly sensitive to contractual
hazards and opportunistic behavior. Second, services are predominantly acquired on the local market (see
Schwartz (1993), Ono (2003), Merino and Rodrand (2007)). Hence, in service transactions both parties are
located in the same local area. This is a necessary condition to identify the change in the opportunistic
attitude of the service suppliers through local social capital.51
Our analysis complements the existing literature in several ways. First, the empirical TCE literature
mainly analyzed the effect of product characteristics on vertical integration, and found overwhelming evi-
dence in favor of TCE predictions. In particular, this literature has focused on asset specificity, risk, product
49We adopt the terminology of Guiso et al. (2010) who propose the term civic capital instead of social capital. See section
3.2 for a definition of civic capital and section 3.3 for a discussion of its measurement.
50In Holmes (1999) the degree of vertical integration is Purchased Inputs Intensity; that is, raw materials over sales. Below,
we make a case for the use of services in the place of raw material.
51This is also the main reason why we prefer services instead of raw materials for the computation of the degree of vertical
integration. Differently from services, raw materials are more tradeable, and hence the location of their suppliers is more
uncertain.
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complexity and uncertainty and their effect on vertical integration.52 In contrast, we focus on the environ-
ment in which a transaction takes place. Hence, we include all sectors of economic activity, as there is no
reason to believe that the effect of opportunistic behavior is limited to the purchase of goods belonging to
some industries only. Our analysis is also close to Holmes (1999). He studies the effect of industry con-
centration on the make-or-buy decision of manufacturing firms in the US.53 He finds a positive correlation
between industry concentration and purchased input intensity of raw materials. In contrast to this study,
we focus on service inputs of firms from all sectors. Finally, while he works with aggregate data at the
county and industry level we work with firm-level data, available at a highly disaggregated geographical
and sectoral level.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to empirically assess the importance of opportunistic
behavior, a behavioral assumption of TCE, for the determination of the boundaries of the firm. We find
a significant effect of the level of civic capital on purchased service intensity. On average, a one standard
deviation surge in local civic capital increases PSI in between 4% and 6%, according the proxy chosen.
We then conclude that firms in environments where people are less opportunistic acquire relatively more
services on the market. This effect is robust against the inclusion of both firm-level controls (number of
workers, capital stock and overall value added) as well as provincial variables which are supposed to affect
the make-or-buy decision (size of the local service market, local GDP, the quality of local formal contract
enforcement). Moreover, we find that the effect of civic capital on vertical integration is greater for smaller
firms.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the theoretical framework out of which we derive
our testable implication, section 3.3 describes the data and the variables employed, sections 3.4 and 3.5
provide the empirical analysis. Finally, section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
Our conceptual framework is based on the TCE (Williamson (1979), Williamson (1985), Williamson (1996)).
Consider a service provider and a client which enter into a contractual relationship. In this context, asset
specificity implies that the provider has to acquire specific physical or human capital to meet the specific
needs of the client. Similarly, it might be that the client have to align its work setting or require specific
knowledge in order to allow the provision of the service or to assist effectively the provider. In this situation,
both parties may be tempted to renegotiate the contract for more favorable terms after the service has
been provided by the supplier, or after the client has adapted to receive the service provision (ex post
opportunism). Contractual hazards further increase due to measurement difficulties. In the case of services,
it may be difficult to measure quality or simply compare it across different suppliers, as service provision
often lacks precise technical specifications. Moreover, information asymmetry between the client and the
provider, and problems in the monitoring of the providers’ performance create principal-agent problems.
Therefore, it is virtually impossible to write a contract which effectively limits the scope for opportunistic
behavior: responsibilities and duties for each contracting party are hard to define, penalties for defection
difficult to specify, and general clauses, which specify the adaptation to unforeseen contingencies, are ineffec-
52See Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for a survey.
53For a theoretical model of agglomeration, opportunism and outsourcing see Helsley and Strange (2007).
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tive. Consequently, the client (or provider) can unjustifiably question the (objectively unverifiable) quality
of the product service or renegotiate contracts after the clients’ (or providers’) specific investment is sunk.
Importantly, however, Williamson (1996) stresses that not only the characteristics of the transaction per
se have an effect on the extent of contractual hazards and hence on the boundaries of the firm, but also
the environment in which the transaction is realized. More specifically, he underlines the importance of
societal culture for economic organization: ”The main import of societal culture [...] is that it serves as a
check on opportunism”.54 In an environment which tolerates cheating, he claims, contractual hazards are
emphasized by weak (or inexistent) social sanctions against opportunistic behavior.
The concept of civic capital captures the extent to which opportunistic behavior is widespread or not in a
society. We adopt the definition proposed by Guiso et al. (2010) who specify civic capital as “those persistent
shared beliefs and values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable
activities”. In other words, civic capital captures the extent to which individuals cooperate even though
they forgo an immediate material benefit. In areas with high social capital, an individual expects his fellow
to cooperate, who, in turn, does not defect because he feels a moral obligation not to do so.55 Alternatively,
the fellow might cooperate simply because he fears the proscription of opportunistic behavior by other
members of the community (see Coleman (1990), Williamson (1996)).56
The high variation of civic capital in Italy can be attributed to historical accidents. According to Putnam
(1993) the pattern of civic capital in Italy was determined by different forms of government emerging during
the middle age. In the Southern part of the peninsula, the kingdom of Sicily came into power during
the 12th century, a highly autocratic regime which oppressed any form of self government and horizontal
bonds between individuals. The republican city-states in the central-norther regions, in contrast, emerged
autonomously and hence enjoyed a much higher degree self-determination. Cooperation between individuals
was essential in those republics, not least to defend their city. This geographic pattern is reflected in figure
10. civic capital is highest in the central Northern regions of Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany and lowest in
the Southern mainland and Sicily.
To sum up, high civic capital poses barriers to narrow minded opportunistic behavior which lowers the
extent of contractual hazards. Consequently, in an environment where civic capital is high the provision
of services is more frequently realized through an arm’s length relationship, with respect to an area where
civic capital is low. As a consequence, we expect purchased service intensity to be higher where civic capital
is higher.57
54See page 268, italics added
55Several motives have been put forward by the literature which explain this seemingly irrational behavior. Cooperative
behavior signals trustworthiness and helps to establish a reputation, which is especially important for service products. However,
reputation is only an imperfect protection against opportunistic behavior, as firms can strategically exploit their reputation in
some circumstances (DeBandt (1996)). Nonstrategic motives for cooperation, independent from sanctions or reward, include
gift exchange (Akerlof (1982)) or preference for fairness (Camerer and Thaler (1995)).
56For empirical evidence on this neighborhood effect see Ichino and Maggi (2000). They show not only that misconduct in
a large Italian bank is higher were civic capital is lower, but also that individuals who move from low to high social capital
areas behave more cooperatively.
57An alternative argument would rely on the fact that firms can imperfectly substitute a high quality service product, for
which only incomplete contracts can be written, with a low quality product, for which complete contracting is possible. See
Chen (2000) for a formalization of this idea. Accordingly, the high (low) quality product is exchanged in areas where civic
capital is high (low). Assigning to the high quality service a higher market value than the low quality service, this implies that
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3.3 Data and variables
3.3.1 Firm Level Variables
The primary source of information is the firm-level dataset AIDA, administered by the Bureau van Dijk.
This is a commercial dataset which provides complete balance sheet information for hundreds of thousands
of Italian firms. Out of this rich dataset, we keep the information on firm size (in terms of number of workers
and sales), total fixed assets, value added, total amount of purchased services, as well as information about
geographical localization (in terms of Italian province), industrial activity code (4-digit NACE 1.1.) and
information on the structure of shareholders. We work with balance sheet data from the year 2001. Since
data are collected at the firm-level, and not at the plant-level, this could be a limitation for our analysis. The
crucial point to understand is that, to the extent that decisions about service outsourcing are taken at the
central level by the parent company, and are not decentralized to individual plants, the measurement error
due to the firm-level aggregation is not an important issue. Under centralization, the degree of outsourcing
of the entire firm will be decided by the managers located in the parent company, and it will be then affected
by the level of civic capital of that province. However, even in the case of outsourcing decisions made at
the individual plant level, when the plants are located in the same province of the parent company, the
use of firm-level data is still adequate, since the different units are influenced by the same set of provincial
regressors. The only case where firm-level data are problematic is when the decision to outsource services
is decentralized at the plant level, and plants are located outside of the province of the parent company.58
However, given that our sample mean is 21 employees per firm, we are confident that multiplant firms
account only for a tiny share of observations.
The choice of carrying out the analysis at the level of provinces (they were 103 in 2001 and correspond
to NUTS3 partitioning in terms of European classification) is motivated by the fact that this is the most
detailed level of spatial disaggregation for which civic capital measures are available. Our analysis deals
with the entire span of economic activity. In the AIDA dataset firms are found that belong to the primary
(agricultural, fishing, and mining), secondary (manufacturing), tertiary (services) sectors. However, firms in
the following areas are not included in AIDA: Public administration and defense, compulsory social security;
Activities of households; Extra-territorial organizations and bodies (2 digit NACE 1.1. sectors 75, 91, 95-99
). We further drop the following industries: Education; Health and social work; Other community, social
and personal service activities (2 digit NACE 1.1. sectors 80, 85, 90, 92-93). The reason for dropping these
activities is that in these sectors government intervention is strong, and this could be confounding for our
results. For example, the decision concerning the outsourcing of services could be less dependent on the
riskiness of transactions with service suppliers, being set by bureaucrats belonging to public bodies whose
behavior are not dictated by high-powered market incentives.59
Let us now turn to the description of the variables we employ. For each firm, the profit and loss
statement contains an item where the total cost of services paid by each firm is reported.60 Since items
our measure of service outsourcing is higher in areas where civic capital is higher.
58We are not the first to employ firm-level data to investigate the degree of vertical disintegration, and to encounter these
problems. See Li and Lu (2009) for a paper about inputs outsourcing in China.
59However, those sectors are included in a robustness check.
60In Appendix 3.7 we give a detailed description of the kind of services that enter this item.
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recorded in the profit and loss statement are collected for accounting purposes, the purchase of specific
services is not singled out, and we have only information on the total amount spent on services. This is
somewhat unfortunate. Firstly, disaggregated info of service inputs allows to take the differing distance
dependency precisely into account. Similarly, contractual hazards are supposed to differ among different
service inputs. The statement also has an item with the amount of total sales. We take the ratio of these two
items (total service purchases and total sales) in order to retrieve what we call Purchased Service Intensity
(PSI hereafter). This is a measure of the degree of service outsourcing at the firm level, relatively to firm
i, located in province j, operating in industry s. In order to obtain a percentage number, this ratio is
multiplied by 100. After removing outliers and firms with missing values, we end up with more than 93 000
firm level observations.61 Figure 12 shows the geographic variation of PSI across Italian provinces. Firms in
the North acquire relatively more services on the market than firms located in the South. Figure 13 shows
that this geographic pattern is not driven by industry characteristics. Removing four digit industry fixed
effects reveals that PSI is highest in the region of Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany in the Center-North, but
the North-South differences remain.
3.3.2 Measurement of Civic Capital
We employ three variables to quantify the stock of provincial civic capital: electoral turnout in referenda,
blood donations and volunteering in non-profit organizations, the latter two standardized by population.62
The motivation to use them as proxies descends from the following reasoning. All three activities imply
individual costs which are not compensated by any material pay-off. Moreover, formal authorities neither
provide incentives nor punish these kind of activities. Rather, individuals who pursue these activities are
driven by a concern for the common good, either by pro-social preferences, social pressure or because they
feel a moral obligation. Consequently, the higher the share of individuals in a given province, the lower is
opportunistic behavior and the higher the stock of civic capital. Obviously, each of these proxies is only an
imperfect measure of civic capital. In order to purge these proxies of the noise, we extract the first principal
component. As expected, we find a strong common pattern in the data. The eigenvalue of the first principal
component is 2.48, the associated eigenvector explains 75% of the total variance. The following Table shows
the correlation between each of the three variables and the resulting principal component.
[ Table 1 about here]
3.3.3 Control Variables
During the estimation process, we consider several potential confounding factors that we address by intro-
ducing appropriate control variables. First of all, we have firm-level controls. They encompass firm size,
expressed in terms of the total number of employees, capital stock, captured by the value of total tangi-
61Concerning the cleaning process, we first remove firms with negative values for sales, workers, purchased services, value
added and capital stock. Then, we cut the 1st percentile and the 99th percentile of the distribution of each of those variables.
Lastly, the same cutting occurs for the ratio of purchased services over sales.
62These proxies have been widely used in the literature. See for example (Guiso et al., 2004; de Blasio and Nuzzo, 2010;
Buonanno et al., 2009). The reason for why we use electoral turnout in referenda rather than in normal political elections is
explained in (Putnam, 1993), page 93.
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ble fixed assets and value added, which, holding firm size and capital stock constant, is a proxy for the
productivity of the firm.
In addition to these firm level controls, we employ several controls related to the local area where the
firm is located. The first is the size of the local service market, calculated as the total number of service
workers employed in each province. Our idea is that the higher it is the size and the number of firms
supplying services in a given local area, the easier it is to outsource services, and so the higher should
be PSI. Obviously, the eventual size of the local services’ market is in turn affected by the propensity of
firms to outsource business services. In other terms, local service market is endogenous with firm-level
PSI. The coefficient’s estimate about the impact of the size of the local market cannot be given a causal
interpretation. As in Merino and Rodrand (2007), we consider the relevant services those belonging to the
2-digit sectors 72, 73, and 74 (NACE rev. 1.1).63 To have an exact measure of service employment, we
take this information from the 8th Industrial Census carried out by the Italian national statistic authority
(ISTAT) in 2001. Firm size is subtracted from the overall number of service workers when a firm operates
in sectors 72-74. Next, we capture the size of the local market by provincial population, weighted by the
share of total industry output destined to final demand. The corresponding information is taken from the
Input-Output Use table and available at the two digit industry level. Importantly, final demand and the
size of the service market control for the effect of thick markets on contractual hazards. For example, in
a buyer-supplier relationship, in agglomerated areas the threat of holding-up the contract partner is less
severe, due to the high number of potential alternative buyers.64.
Finally, the other controls that we include at the level of each local area are the quality of formal
contracting institutions, local financial development and human capital. The functioning of courts are
important determinants of contractual hazards. Well functioning courts decrease contractual uncertainty,
as they are better able to precisely specify responsibilities and duties for each contracting party in the
case a conflict arises. Performance of courts are proxied by the average number of days it take for a civil
proceeding to end in the tribunals located in the province.65 Consequently, service outsourcing should be
higher where proceedings are shorter. As a last control, we include the number of bank branches. As
in Benfratello et al. (2008), the number of bank branches is related to the level of financial development
achieved in a given province. Financial development, in turn, may be correlated to PSI as it could promote
the birth of innovative suppliers providing specialized services to downstream firms, thus increasing serving
outsourcing. As service industries tend to be skill-intensive, human capital holds the availability of skilled
workers constant. This variable is measured by the share of the provincial population holding a university
degree. Data about GDP, length of trials, human capital and the size of the service market come from
ISTAT. Data on the number of bank branches come from the Bank of Italy. Table 2 summarizes the data
used in the regressions.
[Table 9 about here]
63However, in a robustness check we measure the size of the local service market by adding the number of workers employed
in all service sectors.
64See Helsley and Strange (2007) for a theoretical analysis and Joskow (1985) for empirical evidence
65In Italy there were 165 tribunals in 2001, so in some provinces there is more than one tribunal. We calculate the average
for each province over all courts located in the province.
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3.4 Determinants of PSI: OLS Estimates
3.4.1 Preliminary analysis
This section provides evidence from OLS Estimates. We assess the impact of civic capital on purchased
service intensity by estimating the following estimation:
lnPSIi,j,s = α0 + α1PCj + lnX ′iβ + lnZ
′
jδ + γr + γs + i,j,s (13)
where lnPSIi,j,s is the log of purchased service intensity of firm i in province j and four digit industry
s. Our variables of interest is PCj , the stock of civic capital in province j as measured by the principal
component. Xi denominates a vector of firm level controls, including the log of the number of workers,
the log of the capital stock and the log of value added produced by the firm. The set of controls defined
at the provincial level is given by the vector lnZj . It contains the log of the number of service workers,
the log of GDP, the log of final demand, the quality of contract enforcement, human capital and financial
development.66 We control for unobservables at the regional and four digit industry level, as given by the
corresponding dummies γr and γs. The error term i,j,s allows for correlation between observations in the
same province and in the same four digit industry. Equation (13) is estimated by fixed effects in order to
get rid of unobserved γs.
In order to investigate nonlinearities in the effect of civic capital on purchased service intensity, we run
a second regression in which we interact civic capital with firm size, as measured by the number of workers.
Specifically, we run the specification
lnPSIi,j,s = α0 + α1PCj + α2PCj × lnLi + lnX ′iβ + lnZ ′jδ + lnLi × lnZ ′jδ + γr + γs + i,j,s. (14)
In this equation, the interaction is captured by PCj × lnLi, where Li is the number of workers of firm
i. Accordingly, the interaction with firm size is repeated with each province level control, as given by the
interaction term lnLi × lnZj .
We start the discussion of the results by a parsimonious specification in which we regress PSI on civic
capital, controlling only for firm size and region fixed effects. The idea of this exercise is to minimize
problems of endogeneity, given that we have a range of regressors which are potentially endogenous, such
as the firm level productivity or the size of the service market.67
[Tables 10 and 11 about here]
Consider first Tables 10 which shows results from the estimation of a parsimonious version of equation
(13). In columns (1)-(3) we employ each proxy of civic capital separately. As expected, the coefficient
suggests a positive relationship between civic capital and PSI. However, the effect is significant only in
the case of electoral turnout. In this case, an 1% increase in electoral turnout increases purchased service
intensity by almost 0.5%. In column (4), we introduce all three proxies simultaneously. Performing an F-test
of joint significance produces a p-value of 0.09, suggesting that the effect is marginally significant. In column
(4), we employ the principal component which produces a coefficient that is statisically different from zero at
66For a detailed description see Table 9
67The fact that several provincial level controls such as financial development, the quality of contract enforcement human
capital are likely to determined by the stock of civic capital further increases endogeneity problems.
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the 5% level. The pattern becomes much clearer when we allow for nonlinearities in the relationship between
civic capital and PSI. Table 11 shows the results from estimating a parsimonious version of equation (14)
which introduces interaction between civic capital and firm size. Both the main effect of civic capital and
its interaction are statistically different from zero, suggesting the presence of substantial non-linearities.
The F-test that we perform on the three proxies in column (4) produce test statistics of 24.36 for the main
effect and 44.71 for the interaction term confirming the pattern of columns (1) until (3). The fact that the
coefficient of the interaction term is negative is in line with our expectation. It implies that the effect of
civic capital decreases with firm size. As previously outlined, this pattern can be explained by the fact that
it is easier for large firms to reach internal economies of scale in service provision, hence they rely less on
external services (Merino and Rodrand, 2007; ?). Consequently, civic capital becomes less relevant.
In Tables 12 and 13 we show the estimation results of equations (13) and (14), respectively. Consider
first the case of Tables 12. The fact that we have introduce several controls does has change the picture
with respect to Table [1]. The coefficient of civic capital is significant only in the case of electoral turnout.
The p-value of the F-test performed on the three proxies in column (4) takes the value 0.057, suggesting
that the three variables are jointly marginally significant, the same holds for the principal component in
column (5). We therefore cannot convincingly argue that civic capital increases purchased service intensity.
On the other hand firm size, measured in terms of the number of workers, is positively associated with
PSI: firms that hire more workers buy more services on the market with respect to a certain level of sales.
The amount of fixed assets held, ceteris paribus, is also positively correlated to PSI: firms that are capital-
intensive buy more services on the market as a share of sales. In both cases, the rise in service consumption
could be due to demand for workers-related or capital-related services. For example, the larger the stock
of machinery, the greater the expenditure on maintenance. After controlling for firm size and capital stock,
the coefficient of value added reflects the relationship between firm productivity and PSI. The negative sign
is explained by the fact that more productive firms are ceteris paribus larger in terms of sales which, in
turn, increases the denominator of the PSI share. Concerning the provincial controls, we observe that the
coefficients of the size of the local service market, overall market size and final demand all have positive
signs but solely final demand is marginally significant. The reason for the unexpected pattern is that GDP
and the size of the local service market is highly collinear. Performing an F-test of joint significance gives
a test statistic which exceeds 40 in each specification, which implies that the two variables are jointly very
significant.
Not surprisingly, the total number of service workers in the same province is positively correlated with
PSI: a larger supply of services increases on average PSI. We are aware of an endogeneity problem here,
because it could also be the case that it is the larger demand for services (higher PSI) to spur an increase
in the average size of the local service market. The same is true for the local market size.
Again, the effect of civic capital becomes clear-cut when we allow for nonlinearities, as shown in table
Table 13. This suggest that the results displayed in Table 11 are not driven by these confounding factors.
Compared to Table 11, we observe a slight decrease in magnitude of the both the main effect and the
interaction. Interestingly, while the quality of contract enforcement is not significantly related to PSI
in Table 12, results reveal substantial nonlinearities in the relationship between the quality of contract
enforcement and PSI. Specifically, the positive sign of the interaction term implies that the quality of
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contract enforcement seems to have no effect on PSI only for large firms. As before, the explanation could
be that small firms have to rely more on external service provision because they are unable to reach internal
economies of scale. In order to present the results in a more compact way, we use the principal component
as the sole measurement of civic capital for the rest of the paper.
[Table 14 about here]
Next, we perform sensitivity analysis. Specifically, in column (1) - (4) of Table 14 we split the sample into
manufacturing and service sector firms. The idea is to provide evidence that the effect of civic capital on PSI
does not hold for one particular subset of economic activity which then drives the overall results. Columns
(1) and (2) show the results for the manufacturing sector. It is interesting to observe that there is no linear
effect of civic capital on PSI, as shown by the negative coefficient in column (1). However, results in column
(2) show that the effect is robust when we allow for nonlinearities. The magnitude of the effect is roughly
unchanged. Columns (3) and (4) exhibit the results for firms which produces services. The linear effect is
more pronounced in this case. Combining the evidence of column (1) and (3) suggests that the ambiguous
pattern that we obtained in Tables 12 and 13 can be attributed to the fact that civic capital has a linear
effect on PSI only for a subset of the sample. Also, the slight increase magnitude of the nonlinear effect of
civic capital on PSI, as shown in column (4) reveals that civic capital seems to exert a stronger effect of PSI
in the case of service firms. In the last two columns we split the sample according to the quality of contract
enforcement. In principal, formal contract enforcement and trust are substitutes, as they both decrease the
likelihood of contract breach. As a consequence, we expect the effect of civic capital to be more pronounced
in areas where contract enforcement is weak. This reasoning is confirmed in the data. In column (5) we
have included only those firms located in provinces whose quality of contract enforcement is better than
the median quality, that is were the number of days necessary to end a civil trials is lower than the medium
value. In these provinces, civic capital has no effect at all on PSI. Conversely, the effect is more pronounced
in provinces with a low quality of contract enforcement, as shown in the last column.
[Table 15 about here]
Finally, we run several minor robustness checks for the the linear and non-linear case. In column (1) and (2)
of Table [robust] we include additional firm level controls. These include firm age and the square, as well
as an indicator of the shareholder structure. This indicator captures the extent to which firm ownership is
dispersed among various shareholders. Specifically, the variable takes eight different values, depending on
the number of known shareholders. The lower this indicator, the more dispersed is the ownership of the
firm. If the shares are concentrated, the firm is likely to be part of a holding, which in turn could increase
the purchased services. Similarly, older firms are likely to have better knowledge of reliable service providers
which could introduce a positive relationship between age and However, the corresponding results do not
show any variation in the main effect. Next, we include additional provincial controls. First, to the extent
that final demand does not appropriately control for market size, we include provincial GDP. Second, we
are concerned that our results are driven by the presence of industrial districts. Industrial districts can
be described as a geographically limited agglomeration of mainly small scale manufacturing firms. It is
likely that the location in these districts makes facilitates service outsourcing. we proxy the prevalence of
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industrial districts by the share of industrial district workers over total provincial workforce. As columns
(3) and (4) show, our results are not confounded by these variables. Strangely, our proxy for industrial
districts is actually negatively correlated with PSI. We have mentioned previously that we have excluded
from the sample those industries in which official authorities are very present. In columns (5) and (6) firms
operating in these industries are included in the analysis without however affecting our results. Finally,
in the last two columns we exclude provinces which host large cities, in particular the provinces of Rome,
Milan and Turin. Results remain unchanged. If anything, we observe a slight increase in the effect.
3.5 Determinants of PSI: Instrumental Variables Estimates
In this section we show estimates from two stage least square exercises. The motivation to use instrumental
variables stems from the fact that we want to exclude that our results are driven by omitted variables.
Consider for example the case for unobservables at the local level. Even though we remove unobserved
heterogeneity at the regional level, we cannot completely rule out that our results are driven by omitted
factors which vary at a lower geographic scale which contemporaneously increase the stock of civic capital
and induce firms to acquire more services on the market. Similarly, despite our firm level covariates we
might suffer from unobserved firm heterogeneity which might bias our results. We overcome these problems
by instrumenting the current stock of civic capital by historical variables. In particular, we use two sets
of instruments. First, we measure the past stock of civic capital that prevailed during the middle of the
19th and beginning of the 20th century. The second set of instrument goes even further back in time and
exploits information on the density of free-city states per province that existed before 1300. We are confident
that the huge time lag of our instruments makes them immune against the threat of omitted variable bias
potentially present in the OLS results.
The choice of using past values of civic capital as instruments is motivated by the fact that civic capital
is highly persistent over time. For the case of Italy, (Putnam, 1993) conjectures that different political
regimes at the beginning of the second millennium have determined the differences in the contemporaneous
endowment of civic capital within the country. In particular, he stresses the role of the free-city states for
the accumulation of civic capital. Free-city states lacked any form of centralized government. Rather they
were founded by the local population in an attempt to solve problems of common interest, in particular the
threat of foreign invasion. Consequently, individuals developed a strong sense of cooperation and concern for
the common good which translated into high stocks of civic capital. The persistence over centuries has been
confirmed both theoretically and empirically. From a theoretical point of view, models of intergenerational
transmission of values show how the set of values and beliefs that account for the stock of civic capital are
passed on from generation to generation. On the other hand, (Guiso et al., 2008a) show that the status of
a free-city state has increased the stock of civic capital in a causal way. In line with this evidence, we find
a strong first stage relationship.
3.5.1 Results
Table 16 shows the two-stage least squares results. In order to provide OLS estimations comparable to
the 2SLS results, in columns (1) and (2) we have estimated equations (13) and (14), replacing the regional
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dummies γr with macro region dummies.68 Columns (3) and (4) show the results when we use electoral
turnout in the 1920s and members in mutual aid societies as instruments. The two columns are two
stage least squares counterparts of equations (13) and (14). Consider first column (3) in which we do not
incorporate non-linearities. The first stage, shown in Panel B1 confirms the persistence of civic capital, as
our instrument has a positive and significant effect on the stock of contemporaneous civic capital. Moreover,
the exogenous variables explain a huge share of the total variation in civic capital. The second stage results
depicted in Panel A are qualitatively similar to the OLS results in that civic capital has a positive impact
on PSI. The magnitude of the effect is substantially higher than in the case of OLS. In contrast to the OLS
estimates, however, the effect is now statistically significant. In column (4) we allow for nonlinearities in the
effect of civic capital. Specifically, we have interacted both historical variables with firm size to instrument
the interaction. Panel B1 and B2 again exhibit a strong relationship between instruments and instrumented
variables. In the case of the interaction effect, shown in Panel B2, we have that the interaction of both
turnout and members in mutual aid societies are significantly correlated with their current counterpart.
Our set of instruments moreover explains a large share of the variations in the instrumented variable. In
the case of the main effect the R2 reaches 84%, in the case of the interaction term the R2 is 0.81. For
both instrumented variables, the F-statistic reveals that the instruments are jointly very significant. The
corresponding second stage results are shown in Panel A. They are in line with the OLS results. The
interaction term is identical in terms of magnitude to the OLS interaction, the main effect displays a slight
increase.
Finally, in the last column we use information on the free-city experience as instruments. A free-city state
in a province before 1300 increases significantly the stock of civic capital compared to provinces without
free-cities. As expected, the increase is even larger if the province hosts two free-city states. The exogenous
variables in this specification explain two thirds of the total variation in current civic capital and the three
dummies are jointly very significant. Again, the second stage results underline the importance of civic
capital for service outsourcing.
3.6 Conclusion
The focus of this paper is to analyze empirically the extent of opportunism on business outsourcing. TCE
predicts that contractual hazards due to asset specificity, complexity or uncertainty are further exacerbated
when the exchange takes place in an environment where opportunistic behavior is widespread. In such an
environment, more transactions take place within firms than in an arm’s length relationship, ceteris paribus.
To identify the effect of opportunism, we exploit the high variation of social capital in Italy. By definition,
high social capital allows individuals to overcome free rider problems in groups, hence agents are more likely
to forgo immediate material gains in favor of socially beneficial outcomes, in our case the realization of a
transaction. Consequently, high social capital is associated with low opportunism. social capital is measured
at the provincial level and gauged by electoral turnout in referenda, volunteering and blood donation. The
extent of business outsourcing is measured by purchased service intensity, the share of the amount spent on
services over total sales.
As predicted by the transaction cost literature, social capital turns out to be an effective safeguard against
contractual hazards. In particular, a one standard increase in social capital leads to an increase in purchased
service intensity by 4%-6%, depending on the measure of social capital. In other words, if Naples had the
level of social capital of Belluno (a increase twice the standard deviation), its purchased service intensity
increased from 28,4 to 32 percent. This effect is robust against the inclusion of varios firm level covariates,
such as firm size, capital stock and value added and province level controls, including quality of contract
68This set of geographic controls consists of five areas: North West, North East, Center, South and Islands.
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enforcement, the size of the service market, overall market size and financial development. Moreover, we find
that the effect of social capital on PSI depends on firm size. In particular, smaller firms are more sensitive
to the stock of social capital. We believe that missing internal economies of scale in service provision in
small firms and the resulting higher dependency on external service providers drives this result.
Finally, two caveats are in order. Firstly, we limit our interpretation in that we provide theoretically
appealing, robust correlations. Indeed, our estimations can’t be given a causal relationship as the included
covariates are endogenous. Secondly, due to data restrictions we are unable to distinguish different service
inputs. For policy reasons, however, it would be desirable to differentiate among the various kinds of services,
in order to identify more precisely the contractual difficulties to improve exchange performance and overall
welfare.
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Definition of Purchased Services
Under the Italian accounting system, the exact amount of purchased services is reported in a specific item in
the profit and loss account of each firm in the section dedicated to the costs of production. This item contains
all the services expenses coming from ordinary firm activity. The list that follows provides some of the most
common services purchases: Electricity, telephone, fax, water, gas etc. - Travel and accommodation expenses
- Repairing and maintenance carried out by external firms - Intermediate production stages outsourced to
external firms - Advising in the technical, legal, fiscal, administrative, commercial and accounting fields -
Advertising and marketing - Commissions and reimbursement of expenses for agents and representatives -
Vigilance and security - Cleaning - Remunerations and reimbursements paid to administrators and auditors
- Costs for the personnel temporary hired from other firms - Costs for the canteen, nursery school, holiday
camps, employees clubs, etc. (these costs are net of the amount of money that is to charged to employees) -
Costs for luncheon vouches distributed to employees - Costs for refresher courses for employees. - Costs for
board and lodging of employees in secondment. The item B7 also lists costs for services provided by banks
and financial agencies different from true financial charges. Those include: rental fees for safe-deposit boxes,
service payments for utilization fees, costs for safe-keeping of bonds, commissions for bond bails (if not held
to obtain financing), expenses and commissions for factoring (excluding financial charges), expenses for
valuation of real estates to obtain loans, expenses for preliminary investigations of real estates and financing
(in general, all those expenses different from interests and discounts, commissions of financing and bank
charges and their collaterals.)
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Figure 10: Map of civic capital measured by the first principal component of blood donations, volunteering,
and electoral turnout.
Table 8: Correlation among the proxies of civic capital
Referenda turnout (log) Volunteers (log) Blood donations (log)
Volunteers (log) 0.69 1
Blood donations (log) 0.61 0.57 1
Principle component 0.89 0.87 0.84
Note: The number of observations is 103. Blood donations is the log of the number of blood dona-
tions per 100,000 inhabitants inn 2002; Volunteers is the log of the number of volunteers in non-profit
institutions per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000; Referenda turnout is the log of the average electoral
turnout in referenda between 1946 and 1987; Principal component is the the first principal compo-
nent of the above mentioned three proxies of civic capital. All correlations are statistically different
from zero at the 1% level.
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Figure 11: Map of civic capital measured by the variation of the first principal component within regions.
The figure plots the residuals of a regression of the provincial principal component on regional dummies.
Figure 12: Purchased Service Intensity (Provincial Averages)
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Figure 13: Purchased Service Intensity after removing industry fixed effects. The figure plots the average
provincial residuals of a regression of PSI on four digit industry dummies.
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Table 10:
Dep.Var.: Log of PSI
1 2 3 4 5
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Turnout (log) 0.473** 0.496**
(0.23) (0.25)
Blood Donations 0.023 0.032
(0.03) (0.03)
Volunteers (log) 0.041 0.035
(0.03) (0.03)
Principal Component 0.037**
(0.02)
Size (log) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027
N 93822 93822 93822 93822 93822
Dependent Variable is the log of Purchased Service Intensity. ***,**,* denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
Table 11:
Dep.Var.: Log of PSI
1 2 3 4 5
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Turnout (log) 1.073*** 0.692**
(0.25) (0.29)
Turnout (log) * Size (log) -0.264*** -0.101
(0.06) (0.08)
Blood Donations (log) 0.181*** 0.104**
(0.04) (0.04)
Blood Donations (log) * Size (log) -0.069*** -0.033***
(0.01) (0.01)
Volunteers (log) 0.143*** 0.078*
(0.03) (0.04)
Volunteers * Size (log) -0.043*** -0.019*
(0.01) (0.01)
Principal Component 0.084***
(0.02)
Principal Component * Size (log) -0.021***
(0.00)
Size (log) 1.170*** 0.258*** 0.381*** 0.735** 0.016*
(0.27) (0.05) (0.07) (0.29) (0.01)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test of joint sign. (p-value) 0.000
F-test of joint sign. (p-value) int. 0.000
r2 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.028
N 93822 93822 93822 93822 93822
Dependent Variable is the log of Purchased Service Intensity. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%
level, respectively.
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Table 12:
Dep.Var.: Log of PSI
1 2 3 4 5
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Turnout (log) 0.469** 0.517**
(0.22) (0.21)
Blood Donations (log) 0.007 0.024
(0.02) (0.02)
Volunteers (log) 0.013 0.011
(0.02) (0.02)
Principal Component 0.020*
(0.01)
Size (log) 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Capital Stock (log) 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Value Added (log) -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.050***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Service (log) 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.057*** 0.053***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Final Demand (log) 0.008** 0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Length of Trials (log) -0.020 -0.009 -0.010 -0.023 -0.014
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Bank Branches (log) 0.008* 0.008* 0.007* 0.006 0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
University Graduates (log) -0.080* -0.048 -0.051 -0.088** -0.062
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test of joint sign. (p-value) 0.057
r2 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.032
N 93822 93822 93822 93822 93822
Dependent Variable is the log of Purchased Service Intensity. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%,
10% level, respectively.
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Table 13:
Dep.Var.: Log of PSI
1 2 3 4 5
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Turnout (log) 0.980*** 0.726***
(0.24) (0.27)
Turnout (log) * Size (log) -0.220*** -0.103
(0.05) (0.07)
Blood Donations (log) 0.139*** 0.084**
(0.04) (0.04)
Blood Donations (log) * Size (log) -0.057*** -0.028**
(0.01) (0.01)
Volunteers (log) 0.101*** 0.056
(0.03) (0.04)
Volunteers * Size (log) -0.037*** -0.019
(0.01) (0.01)
Principal Component 0.065***
(0.01)
Principal Component * Size (log) -0.020***
(0.00)
Size (log) 0.726*** 0.060 0.116 0.571*** -0.143*
(0.22) (0.11) (0.14) (0.21) (0.08)
Capital Stock (log) 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Value Added (log) -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.052***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Service (log) 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.055***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Service(log) * Size (log) -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Final Demand (log) 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Final Demand (log) * Size (log) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Length of Trials (log) -0.123*** -0.092** -0.109** -0.098** -0.088**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Length of Trials (log) * Size (log) 0.042*** 0.033** 0.038*** 0.029** 0.029**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Bank Branches (log) -0.019 -0.014 -0.017 -0.031** -0.032**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Bank Branches (log) * Size (log) 0.010* 0.009 0.010 0.015** 0.015**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
University Graduates (log) -0.032 0.021 -0.004 -0.041 -0.015
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
University Graduates (log) * Size (log) -0.018 -0.027 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test of joint sign. (p-value) 0.000
F-test of joint sign. (p-value) int. 0.000
r2 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034
N 93822 93822 93822 93822 93822
Dependent Variable is the log of Purchased Service Intensity. ***,**,* denote ¿ significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level,
respectively.
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Table 16: Instrumental variables analysis
Panel A: Second Stage (Dependent var. is ln PSI)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Principal Component 0.045*** 0.083*** 0.092*** 0.138*** 0.043**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Principal Component * Size (log) -0.019*** -0.022***
(0.00) (0.01)
Size (log) 0.028** -0.821*** 0.028** -0.685*** 0.028**
(0.01) (0.18) (0.01) (0.19) (0.01)
Capital Stock (log) 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Value Added (log) -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.057***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Macro Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interactions No No No Yes No
Hansen test of overidentif. (p-value) 0.1075
r2 0.031 0.033 0.029 0.032 0.009
N 93822 93822 93822 93822 77892
Panel B1: First Stage (Dependent var. is Principal Component)
Coef./se Coef./se
Turnout 1920s (log) 4.752*** 5.459***
(0.92) (1.07)
Turnout 1920s (log) × ln Size -0.447**
(0.22)
Aid Societies 1873 (log) × ln Size 0.059
(0.04)
1 free-city state in 1300 0.404***
(0.15)
2 free-city state in 1300 0.728***
(0.16)
3 free-city state in 1300 -0.178
(0.23)
Macro Region Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test of joint sign. (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
r2 0.835 0.84 0.658
Panel B2: First Stage (Dependent var. is Prin.Comp × ln Size )
Turnout 1920s (log) -2.958
(2.75)
Turnout 1920s (log) * Size (log) 4.414***
(1.25)
Aid Societies 1873 (log) * Size (log) 0.635***
(0.19)
F-test of joint sign. (p-value) 0.000
r2 0.804
Dependent Variable is the log of Purchased Service Intensity. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%,
10% level, respectively.
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4 Chapter 3: Civic Capital and the Performance Differentials
between Foreign and Domestic Firms
4.1 Introduction
The question of whether affiliates of multinational firms outperform purely domestic firms has attracted
huge attention in the literature. The internalization literature (caves1996) stresses that multinational firms
possess sophisticated assets which lack domestic firms, including managerial expertise, process and produc-
tion technologies or brand names. These assets are then transferred to their local affiliates which increase
their performance above that of their domestic counterparts. On the other hand, this literatures stresses the
role of assimilation costs that foreign firms have to incur when operating in a foreign country. Accordingly,
these costs tend to decrease the performance of foreign affiliates as compared to domestic firms. Empirical
evidence which analyze this topic abounds (?????). This huge intellectual interest notwithstanding, no
clear consensus has been reached in this question.
In this paper, we introduce a new dimension into this discussion. In particular, we allow for geographic
heterogeneity in the effect of foreign ownership on firm performance: Employing Italian firm level data, we
show that the effect of foreign ownership on firm performance depends on the stock of civic capital prevailing
in the area in which the firm is located. The reason is that the foreign firms are plagued by substantial gov-
ernance costs as they operate in culturally different countries. This increases problems of coordination and
information processing. Moreover, managing affiliates from distant headquarters exacerbates the incidence
of agency problems (??). By reducing the scope of opportunistic behavior, civic capital alleviates agency
problems and enhances cooperation in intra-firm interactions. Hence, civic capital reduces governance costs
of firms which improves firm performance. Using panel data on Italian manufacturing firms, we take this
prediction to the data. Focusing on Italy is particularly convenient for our exercise, as the intense investiga-
tion of civic capital in this country (Banfield, 1958; Putnam, 1993; Guiso et al., 2004) has produced a range
of indirect measure of civic capital. Specifically, as in Guiso et al. (2004), we proxy civic capital by the
number of blood donations and electoral turnout in referenda. The third proxy is the number of volunteers
in non-profit organizations per province. In order to minimize problems of measurement error, we extract
the first principal component.
Results confirm the hypothesis that civic capital reduces assimilation costs of foreign firms. Our estima-
tion approach rests on a two stage approach. In the first stage we estimate total factor productivity by the
semi-parametric approach proposed by ?. The obtained firm productivity is then regressed on our variables
of interest, in particular the interaction between a dummy identifying a foreign firm and the stock of local
civic capital, measured at the provincial level. During the estimation process, we explicitly take unobserved
heterogeneity at the firm level into account by estimating the regression in first differences. Moreover, we
allow for industry, province, and time specific trends. We find that the stock of local civic capital is more
important for firms which change ownership, as compared to those firms where no change occurs. When we
further disaggregate into firms which become foreign owned and those which become domestically owned,
we observe that the interaction with civic capital is significant only for those acquired by a foreign investor.
These findings complement the existing literature along several lines. First, we extend the branch of
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studies which has looked at performance differentials between domestic firms and foreign affiliates. This
question has been analyzed with data from different countries, including the United Kingdom (???), the US
?, Germany (?) and Slovenia (?). As for the case of Italy, ? find that foreign ownership has no effect on firm
performance, which is at odds with most of the previous literature. However, each of these studies implicitly
assumes that the assimilation costs that foreign affiliates face do not vary geographically. In contrast, our
study underlines the importance of local characteristics, in particular the stock of civic capital in that it
affects the performance of foreign and domestic firms differently.
Second, the international business literature recently has stressed the role of governance costs in determining
the performance of multinational firms (???). Analyzing the performance of Norwegian multinationals, ?
find that governance costs (i.e. costs related to bargaining, monitoring and maladaptation) significantly
reduce the performance of foreign affiliates. Differently to them, we study the role of governance costs
by comparing firms which become foreign affiliates to those where no change in ownership status occurs.
Moreover, we take into account the role of the environment in determining governance costs, and hence the
performance of multinationals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we outline the mechanism by which civic
capital reduces assimilation costs. Section 4.3 presents the data and the methodological approach, while
section section 4.5 describes the results. Finally, section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Civic Capital and the Governance Costs of Foreign Firms
Relying on Guiso et al. (2010), we define civic capital as “those persistent values and beliefs that help
a group overcome the free-rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities”.69 The important
characteristic that civic capital entails is its property to hamper narrow-minded self-interested behavior in
collective endeavors. Reducing the scope of opportunistic behavior, in turn, reduces governance costs of
intra-firm transactions substantially as it removes agency problems and dilemmas of collective action at the
root. This important property of civic capital has been proved by ?. Employing Italian census data, they
show that the cooperation-enhancing effect of civic capital allows firms to operate on a larger scale.
More specifically, the business literature has stressed the role of three interrelated determinants of
internal transaction costs (???). The first concerns information and knowledge. The relevant information
for decision making is distributed among individuals within a firm. Firm organization has to be designed
in such a way as to facilitate a smooth flow of information and knowledge among its members both within
and across hierarchies. Second, the tasks required for production have to be efficiently coordinated. This
requires identification of complementarity of action and the corresponding coordination of the production
process. Third, firm members often pursue personal goals which are not necessarily congruent with those of
the firm as a whole. Therefore, a motivational scheme is necessary which ensures that agents take actions
which are consistent with the objective function of the firm.
Importantly, the incidence of intra-firm transaction cost is substantially higher in the case of multina-
tional firms as compared to domestically owned firms (?). The increase stems from two interrelated set of
factors which affect each of the above mentioned areas. First, operation in different countries implies sub-
69See Guiso et al. (2010) on page 7.
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stantial spatial separation of production facilities which makes an efficient coordination of the various tasks
of the production process more cumbersome. Moreover, asymmetric information between local managers
and foreign shareholders as well as the difficulty to effectively monitor distant agents exacerbate agency
problems (?). The second set of factors are cultural differences among countries. This increases the further
complicate the flow of information and knowledge among foreign affiliates and the mother company (??).
Expectedly, these increased governance costs have a negative effect on firm performance (?). Therefore, civic
capital has a huge effect in reducing governance costs of foreign firms. Importantly, we expect this effect to
be more important for foreign affiliates than for purely domestic firms or firms which become domestically
owned. As a consequence, firm performance of firms which are acquired by a foreign investor should benefit
more from civic capital than its domestic counterparts.
Note that we deviate from most of the business literature in an important dimension. Several studies
have shown that cooperation among firm members is determined by firm policies ((Spagnolo, 1999; ?)). We
deviate from this assumption in that cooperative behavior is exclusively determined by the stock of civic
capital in the area in which a firm is located. This assumption is fostered by empirical evidence. Analyzing
a dataset from a large Italian bank, Ichino and Maggi (2000) show the cooperative behavior of workers is to
a large extent determined by individual background. Similarly, ? find that national and corporate culture
are strongly correlated.
4.3 Data Description
4.3.1 The UniCredit-Capitalia dataset
We work with the 7th, 8th and 9th wave of the UniCredit-Capitalia dataset. Each wave covers a period of
three years, which implies that the period under consideration ranges from 1995 until 2003. The dataset
encompasses the universe of manufacturing firms with more than 500 employees, as well as a stratified
and rotating sample of smaller firms. Half of the firms are replaced by new firms in subsequent waves.
The choice of the firms to be dropped is random and tries to maintain the structure of stratification. The
minimum size of firms in the three waves are 10 employees. In the survey, firms are asked to provide detailed
information about their ownership structure, labor force, R&D activity, internationalization and finance.
The information from the survey is then combined with yearly balance sheet data from AIDA, enabling us
to work with a rich firm-level data set.
In the survey, firms are asked to report their ownership structure just once in each wave, with reference
to the last year of the wave. In order to allow the implementation of panel techniques with an adequate
number of observations, we use only those firms which are at least two consecutive waves in the sample.
Concerning the definition of a foreign affiliate, we stick to the standard definition whereby a firm is classified
as foreign-owned firm (FO) if at least 10% of the equity is hold by one or more foreign persons. Firms are
then classified into four groups, according to their ownership status: firms which are always foreign-owned
over (always); firms that are never foreign-owned (never); firms that start being foreign-owned (starters),
because the equity hold by foreigners reaches the 10% threshold; firms that stop being foreign-owned, because
the amount of equity hold by foreigners goes below the threshold (stoppers). After removing outliers we end
up with 1600 firms. Calculating first differences gives 1989 observations which split into the four ownership
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categories as follows: 74 starters, 51 stoppers, 16 always and 1858 never.
Table 17 provides descriptive statistics for different kinds of firms according to their ownership structure.
[Table 17 about here]
The table confirms the well known result that foreign firms outperform their domestic counterparts in terms
of size and productivity. This is especially true for firms which are foreign owned over two consecutive periods
(always): they constitute the largest and the most productive firms in our sample. When comparing the
relative performance of firms which become foreign owned to those which become domestic, we do not find
a clear pattern in terms of productivity. However, starters seem to be larger than stoppers, both in terms of
capital stock and the number of workers. Note that for both starters and stoppers the change in ownership
is associated with a relative improvement in terms of productivity but with a relative decline in capital
stock and workforce.
4.3.2 Measurement of civic capital
As mentioned earlier, we measure the stock of civic capital in a given province by the number of blood
donations per 1000 inhabitants, average electoral turnout in referenda held between 1946 and 1987 and
the number of volunteers in non profit organization, standardized by population. The choice as proxies for
civic capital is governed by the following reasoning. First, all activities are associated with a personal cost.
Second, their are neither financial nor legal incentives to pursue one of those activities. Hence, the reasons
why individuals vote, donate blood or engage as volunteers is that they have internalized some common
good for which they are disposed to incur costs without receiving any material compensation.70 In section
??, we have outlined that the stock of civic capital consists of these behavioral characteristics.
As each of our proxies of civic capital is supposed to be measured with error, we extract the first principal
component out of the three variables. The following Table shows the correlation coefficient between the
proxies and the resulting first principal component.
[ Table 18 about here ]
As expected, we have a strong positive relationship between each of our three proxies. The fact that
the correlation is far from being perfect implies that the proxies are blurred by idiosyncratic factors. The
relationship between the first principal component and each of the three proxies is roughly equally strong
which means that there is a strong common pattern among the three variables.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
In order to identify the differential impact of civic capital on firm performance according to the firms’
ownership, we fall back on a two step procedure.71 In a first step Total Factor Productivity (hereafter
TFP) is estimated by the semi-parametric approach proposed by ?. The advantage of this methodology is
that it takes the potential endogeneity of the input factors into account. In particular, the choice of input
quantities might be the outcome of firm productivity. More specifically, TFP is obtained by estimating
70Alternatively, it could be social pressure which leads individuals to engage in those activities.
71This strategy is common in the literature. See for example ? in the case of spillovers from FDI or ? in the case of exporters.
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separate production functions for each 2-digit NACE sector.72 The generic industry s production function
is
yijst = αs1kit + α
s
2skit + α
s
3unskit + ωijst, (15)
where yijst labels the log of value added of firm i in province j in industry s at time t. The logarithm of
capital stock and the logarithm of the number of skilled and unskilled workers of the firm are denominated
kit, skit, and unskit, respectively.73 In this way, the logarithm of TFP is represented by ωijst and computed
for each firm in the industry.
In a second step, we regress log TFP on our variables of interest. We assume that log TFP at the firm
level is governed by the following linear equation:
ωijst = α0 + α1FOit + α2(FOit ∗ CCj) + α3(FOit ∗ lnPOPj) + γj + γs + γt + γi + γjt+ γst+ ijst. (16)
In (16), foreign ownership of firm i is denominated by FOit, a dummy which equals 1 if firm i is foreign-
owned at time t. Civic capital in province j where firm i is located is labeled CCj . In order to capture
the differential impact of civic capital on firm performance, we add as a regressor the interaction of foreign
ownership and civic capital, FOit ∗ CCj . The log of population in a given province, labeled POPj , proxies
for market size. Population is averaged over the years 1995-2003.
Investment by foreign investors is by no means randomly assigned across firms. We explicitly consider
two sources of selection bias. The first source of selection bias is at the firm level. Several studies have
shown that foreign investors acquire those domestic firms which display an above-average productivity level
(?, ?). Table 17 shows that this pattern also holds in our sample. Both starters and stoppers outperform
domestic firms in terms of productivity. Moreover, they are significantly larger in terms of capital stock and
number of employees. Hence, in order to construct a valid control group in the regression, we allow for firm
specific effects (γi). It captures all time constant, unobserved firm characteristics such as managerial skills,
sophisticated technologies or brand names which simultaneously attract foreign investors and increase firm
performance.74
The second source of selection bias concerns the location decision of foreign firms. An extensive literature
studying the location decision of foreign firms has found that foreign direct investment is directed into
areas with a favorable business environment (????). In particular, foreign firms prefer locations with well-
functioning institutions, access to large markets and good infrastructure. Accordingly, we include in our
regression γj , a dummy capturing province fixed effects. We are confident that by controlling for province
fixed effects, all unobserved heterogeneity concerning firms’ business environments which determine firm
performance is removed. Industry and year fixed effects are captured by γs and γt, respectively. We also
include industry and province specific trends, labeled γst and γjt, respectively. Finally, the error term ijst
has mean zero and is assumed to be uncorrelated with each of the regressors.
72In order to increase precision we use the entire sample for TFP estimation and not just those firms which are at least for
two consecutive waves in the sample. The respective trimming procedure is explained in the appendix.
73A detailed description of the variables used is provided in the Appendix.
74In a robustness check, we include further firm level controls into the regression. These include capital stock, total number
of employees and number of skilled workers.
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In order to overcome the endogeneity of FOit we run equation 16 with first differences.75 Hence, all time
constant effects at the firm level are wiped out. The change in log TFP between two consecutive waves can
then be expressed as
∆ωijst = β0 + α1∆(FOit) + α2∆(FOit ∗ CCj) + α3∆(FOit ∗ lnPOPj)
+ γt + γj + γs + ∆ijst
(17)
where the terms γt, γj , γs capture year, sector and province specific trends, respectively. The differenced
error term is ∆ijst. The reference group in equation (17) consists of firms which do not change their
ownership status, that is both purely domestic firms and those which are always under foreign ownership.
In the context of our study it is important to carefully assess the type of ownership change that a firm
undergoes and its interaction with civic capital. As outlined in section ?? the governance costs that a foreign
investor faces when acquiring a firm is supposed to be larger than in the case of an acquisition by a domestic
investor.76 Consequently, we create a dummy variable START which equals one whenever ∆FO = +1 and
a dummy variable STOP which equals one in the case that ∆FO = −1. Equation (17) is then transformed
into
∆ωijst = α0 + α1STARTit + α2(STARTit ∗ CCj) + α3STOPi + α4(STOPit ∗ CCj)
+ α5(STARTit ∗ lnPOPj) + α6(STOPit ∗ lnPOPj) + γt + γs + γj + ∆ijst.
(18)
As before, the base group now consists of firms which do not change ownership status. When estimating
equations (17) and (18) we cluster standard errors along two dimensions. First, we allow for correlation of
observations from the same province. This is necessary because some regressors vary only at the provincial
level (Moulton, 1990). Second, as we have some observations which belong to the same firm, standard errors
also take serial correlation into account.77
4.5 Results
Table 19 shows the results from the estimation of equation (17) with different measures of civic capital.
[Insert Table 19 about here]
In column (1), civic capital is proxied by electoral turnout in referenda, in column (2) volunteering is used
whereas in column (3) the number of blood donations is employed. Finally, the last column displays the
regression when we use the first principal component of the three variables. In all columns, provincial
population, interacted with the foreign ownership dummy, controls for differing effects of local market
size on productivity growth, according to whether a firm changes ownership status. Moreover, in each
specification we allow for province, industry and a time specific trends by including corresponding dummy
variables into the regression. In each specification, the coefficient of the dummy which captures a change
in foreign ownership status is negative and significant. This suggests that in the (hypothetical) province in
which both population and the stock of civic capital is zero, firms which become foreign owned (∆FO = +1)
75The calculation of first differences is based on the last year of each wave.
76This conjecture is fostered by the pattern in Table 17. Starters display a more pronounced relative decline in capital stock
and labor force as compared to stoppers.
77On two way clustering see Cameron and Miller (2010).
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perform on average worse than firms which do not experience a change in ownership. On the other hand, the
positive interaction coefficient of foreign ownership and civic capital implies that the effect of civic capital
on productivity growth is not homogeneous across firms. As expected, the effect of civic capital seems to be
larger for firms which experience a change in ownership status. This pattern holds for each proxy of civic
capital. On the other hand, for a firm which ceases to be foreign owned (∆FO = −1), results suggest that
its productivity growth is lower compared to constant ownership firms when civic capital is high.
As we are particularly interested in the effect of civic capital on those firms which are acquired by a
foreign investor, we allow for different ownership effects on firm performance, according to whether a firm
becomes domestic or foreign owned. Results displayed in Table 20 correspond to the estimation of equation
(18).
[Insert Table 20 about here]
As before, each column in Table 20 corresponds to a different proxy of civic capital. The last column shows
the estimates when civic capital is measured by the principal component. Consider first the case when a firm
becomes foreign owned (START ) and the interaction with civic capital. As before, in the hypothetical case
when both population and civic capital is zero, firms which become foreign owned have a lower productivity
growth compared to constant ownership firms as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient of the
dummy identifying a switch into foreign ownership. Importantly, the positive coefficient of the interaction
term implies that the effect of civic capital again is higher for firms that become foreign owned. Only when
civic capital is measured by volunteering this effect is not significant.
In order to quantify the effect of a switch into foreign ownership on TFP growth more precisely, we
evaluate its marginal effect at different points of the distribution of civic capital. Provincial population is
fixed at the sample mean. A firm which is located in the province corresponding to the first quartile, the
marginal effect becoming foreign owned is negative, reaching -0.21. The effect for the median firm is -0.05.
Only starters in provinces with very high stock of civic capital (from the 95th percentile onwards) display
a positive effect of ownership on TFP growth.
As for firms which become domestically owned (STOP ) the pattern is reversed, i.e. the interaction
with civic capital is negative. Interestingly, in this case the effect of civic capital is statistically no longer
different from that of constant ownership firms. This is in line with our expectation, given that we expect
governance costs of starters to be larger than that of stoppers. Consequently, the cooperation enhancing
effect of civic capital becomes less relevant.
Finally, in Table 21 we perform some robustness checks. Columns (1)-(3) show several variations of
equation (18), while columns (4)-(6) of equation (17). In columns (1) and (4) we include additional firm
level controls into the regression, namely the growth rate of size, capital stock and the number of skilled
workers. While the specification in first differences eliminates all sorts of time constant unobservables, we
cannot exclude that foreign investors base their investment decision on a certain growth pattern of firm
characteristics. Results are essentially unaffected.78 Next, in columns (2) and (4) we measure the size of
the local market by provincial gross domestic product instead of population.79 There is a tiny decrease in
78These additional control variables are not available for the whole sample. Therefore, the number of observations increases
slightly.
79Similarly to provincial population we average gross domestic product for each province over the period 1995-2003.
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magnitude but the coefficient is still statistically different from zero. Finally, in columns (3) and (6), we
measure firm performance by labor productivity, defined as value added per worker. Results are robust to
this change in measurement.
4.6 Conclusion
In this article, we have empirically shown that the effect of foreign ownership on firm performance depends
on the stock of civic capital in the area in which the firm is located. More specifically, we have assigned
firms into four different groups: firms which become foreign owned, firms which become domestically owned
and firms where no ownership change occurs, i.e. purely domestic and foreign firms. When comparing the
effect of civic capital for switchers against that of constant ownership firms, we find that civic capital is
more important only for firms that become foreign owned. This suggests that civic capital substantially
decreases assimilation costs of foreign firms.
The estimation approach took explicitly care of unobserved firm heterogeneity as well as industry, province,
and time trends. Firm performance was quantified by total factor productivity, estimated semi-parametrically
by the approach suggested by ?.
This study provides important new insights on the effect of foreign ownership on firm performance.
Rather than assuming that assimilation costs of foreign affiliates are constant within a country, we stress
the importance of local characteristics, such as the level of local trust which exert a heterogeneous effect
on these costs and hence on firm performance. On the other hand, our study shows that future research is
needed. For example, we have not analyzed the choice of entry. If, however, civic capital is an important
determinant of assimilation costs then multinational firms will choose their mode of entry accordingly, or
eventually abstain from an investment.
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Table 17: Performance of Switchers relative to Purely Domestic Firm
STARTERS (74) STOPPERS (41) ALWAYS (16)
After Change Before Change After Change Before Change
TFP 1.075 1.069 1.054 1.046 1.143
VAW 1.039 1.039 1.056 1.037 1.122
Capital 1.137 1.224 1.096 1.156 1.311
Size 2.110 4.058 1.576 2.288 3.596
Figures show relative performance of the different kind of switchers relative to purely domestic firm. TFP
denotes Total Factor Productivity, V AW denotes value added per worker, Capital is the firm’s capital stock.
Size is firm size, measured by the number of workers.
Table 18: Correlation among the proxies of civic capital
Referenda turnout (log) Volunteers (log) Blood donations (log)
Volunteers (log) 0.69 1
Blood donations (log) 0.61 0.57 1
Principle component 0.89 0.87 0.84
Note: The number of observations is 103. Blood donations is the log of the number of blood dona-
tions per 100,000 inhabitants inn 2002; Volunteers is the log of the number of volunteers in non-profit
institutions per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000; Referenda turnout is the log of the average electoral
turnout in referenda between 1946 and 1987; Principal component is the the first principal compo-
nent of the above mentioned three proxies of civic capital. All correlations are statistically different
from zero at the 1% level.
Table 19:
Dependent Variable: ∆ lnTFP
1 2 3 4
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
∆FO -5.329*** -1.943*** -1.422*** -0.769***
(1.72) (0.65) (0.36) (0.23)
∆FO ∗ lnTurnj 1.046***
(0.39)
∆FO ∗ lnV oluntj 0.137**
(0.06)
∆FO ∗ lnBloodj 0.210**
(0.10)
∆FO ∗ PCj 0.071**
(0.03)
∆FO ∗ lnPOPj 0.100*** 0.107*** 0.091*** 0.104***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
cons -0.558*** -0.556*** -0.559*** -0.558***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Industry FE (2 digit) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.356 0.355 0.355 0.356
N 1989 1989 1989 1989
Dependent variable is ∆ lnTFP . ∆FO captures changes in ownership and takes
two values: ∆FO = +1 (∆FO = −1) if a firm becomes foreign (domestically)
owned. lnPOP is the log of provincial population averaged over the period 1995-
2003. We use the following variables to measure civic capital: Blood is the log of
the number of blood donations per 100,000 inhabitants in 2002; Volunt is the log
of the number of volunteers in non-profit institutions per 100,000 inhabitants in
2000; Turn is the log of the average electoral turnout in referenda between 1946
and 1987; PC is the first principal component of the above mentioned three prox-
ies of civic capital. All regressions include industry (2 digit), province and year
fixed effects. Standard errors allow for correlation between observations located in
the same province and between observations belonging to the same firms. ***,**,*
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
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Table 20:
Dependent Variable: ∆ln TFP
1 2 3 4
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
START -6.084*** -1.618** -1.595*** -0.757**
(1.71) (0.70) (0.52) (0.31)
START ∗ lnTurnj 1.223***
(0.38)
START ∗ lnV oluntj 0.104
(0.07)
START ∗ lnBloodj 0.256*
(0.14)
START ∗ PCj 0.074***
(0.03)
STOP 3.750 2.453* 1.075* 0.759**
(3.34) (1.37) (0.64) (0.30)
STOP ∗ lnTurnj -0.692
(0.76)
STOP ∗ lnV oluntj -0.191
(0.15)
STOP ∗ lnBloodj -0.126
(0.18)
STOP ∗ PCj -0.063
(0.07)
START ∗ lnPOPj 0.098** 0.103** 0.093** 0.103**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
STOP ∗ lnPOPj -0.095* -0.111** -0.083* -0.100**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
cons -0.559*** -0.559*** -0.564*** -0.560***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Industry FE (2 digit) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.356 0.355 0.355 0.356
N 1989 1989 1989 1989
Dependent variable is ∆ lnTFP . START is a dummy variable which equals one
if a firm becomes foreign owned. STOP is a dummy variable which equals one if
a firm becomes domestically owned. lnPOP is the log of provincial population av-
eraged over the period 1995-2003. We use the following variables to measure civic
capital: Blood is the log of the number of blood donations per 100,000 inhabitants
in 2002; Volunt is the log of the number of volunteers in non-profit institutions per
100,000 inhabitants in 2000; Turn is the log of the average electoral turnout in ref-
erenda between 1946 and 1987; PC is the first principal component of the above
mentioned three proxies of civic capital. All regressions include industry (2 digit),
province and year fixed effects. Standard errors allow for correlation between ob-
servations located in the same province and between observations belonging to the
same firms. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.
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Table 21: Robustness Analysis
Firm Cov. GDP VA/worker Firm Cov. GDP VA/worker
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
∆FO -0.806*** -0.978*** -0.823***
(0.24) (0.30) (0.20)
∆FO ∗ PCj 0.072** 0.055* 0.054**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
START -0.846** -0.946** -0.756***
(0.34) (0.40) (0.28)
START ∗ CCj 0.068** 0.059** 0.069***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
STOP 0.697** 0.989*** 0.844***
(0.30) (0.38) (0.29)
STOP ∗ CCj -0.075 -0.047 -0.022
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
∆FO ∗ lnPOPj 0.110*** 0.119***
(0.04) (0.03)
∆FO ∗ lnGDPj 0.094***
(0.03)
START ∗ lnPOPj 0.121** 0.110***
(0.05) (0.04)
STOP ∗ lnPOPj -0.085* -0.119***
(0.05) (0.04)
START ∗ lnGDPj 0.092**
(0.04)
STOP ∗ lnGDPj -0.094**
(0.04)
∆ lnSIZE 0.016 0.017
(0.05) (0.05)
∆ lnCAPITAL -0.114*** -0.115***
(0.02) (0.02)
∆ lnSkill -0.032* -0.032**
(0.02) (0.02)
cons -0.078** -0.064** -0.041 -0.082** -0.064** -0.042
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Industry FE (2 digit) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.378 0.356 0.491 0.379 0.356 0.492
N 1807 1989 1995 1807 1989 1995
Dependent variable is ∆ lnTFP in columns (1), (2), (4), (5). Dependent Variable in columns (3) and (6) is
∆ lnV A/worker, where V A/worker stands for value added per worker. ∆FO captures changes in ownership and
takes two values: ∆FO = +1 (∆FO = −1) if a firm becomes foreign (domestically) owned. START is a dummy
variable which equals one if a firm becomes foreign owned. STOP is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm
becomes domestically owned. lnGDP and lnPOP , respectively, are the log of provincial gross domestic product and
the log of provincial population both averaged over the period 1995-2003. The variable employed to measure civic
capital is Principal component, which is the first principal component of the log of the number of blood donations
per 100,000 inhabitants, the log of the number of volunteers in non-profit institutions per 100,000 inhabitants in
2000, the log of the average electoral turnout in referenda between 1946 and 1990. ∆ lnSIZE is the first difference
in firm size, as measured by the log of the number of workers. ∆ lnK is the first difference in the firm’s log of capital
stock. ∆ lnSKILL is the first difference in the log of the number of skilled workers. All regressions include industry
(2 digit), province and year fixed effects. Standard errors allow for correlation between observations located in the
same province and between observations belonging to the same firms. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%,
10% level, respectively.
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5 Conclusion
The three chapters of this thesis have underlined the importance of civic capital in governing economic
relationships. The results foster the importance of informal institutions for individual behavior which bears
huge impact on aggregate economic outcomes. Specifically, it has been empirically shown that civic capital
increases the size of economic organizations, induces firms to outsource services and reduces the assimilation
costs of foreign affiliates.
While this thesis has revealed important effects of civic capital on aggregate economic outcomes, more
research is needed that combines the micro and macro level of analysis. In particular, the thesis has taken
the stock of civic capital at the province level as given. In order to understand the functioning of civic capital
at the micro level more fully, it would be important to investigate the what exactly induces individuals to
cooperate. The literature has established several hypothesis, such as the role of pro-social preferences or risk
aversion which might be behind the deviation of narrow-minded self interested behavior. The identification
of the precise individual mechanism that induce a certain stock of civic capital still awaits future research.
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